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Access to the Federal Courts for Title VII
Claimints in the Post-Kremer Era: Keeping
the Doors Open
Andrea Catania*
I. INTRODUCTION
In Kremer v. Chemical Construction Corp.,' the Supreme Court
held that a state judicial affirmance of an administrative determina-
tion rejecting a state employment discrimination claim has preclu-
sive effect with respect to the employee's Title VII2 claim in federal
court. In the Court's view, neither the language nor the legislative
history of Title VII implies that Congress intended to modify the
mandate of 28 U.S.C. § 17383 ("section 1738") which requires fed-
eral courts to give the same preclusive effect to state judgments
that the courts of the rendering state would give. This application
of section 1738 is consistent with other recent Supreme Court cases
on claim and issue preclusion4 in the civil rights area,5 reflecting an
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1. 456 U.S. 461 (1982).
2. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(l) (1982). Title VII prohibits differential treatment in hir-
ing, promotion, salaries, and other ". . . terms, conditions, or privileges of employment,
because of such individual's race, color,* religion, sex or national origin ....... Id.
3. In pertinent part, 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (1982) provides that:
The. . . judicial proceedings of any court of any such State. . .shall have the
same full faith and credit in every court within the United States and its Terri-
tories and Possessions as they have by law or usage in the courts of such State
Unlike the Full Faith and Credit Clause of Article IV of the Constitution which requires
that only state courts give full faith and credit to judgments of sister states (see Caterpil-
lar Tractor Co. v. International Harvester Co., 120 F.2d 82 (3d Cir. 1941)), § 1738 re-
quires that the state judgment be given full faith and credit by the federal courts as well.
American Sur. Co. v. Baldwin, 287 U.S. 156, 166 (1932). Thus, when the first suit is in a
state court and the second is in a federal court, the requirement of full faith and credit is
statutory in origin, not constitutional. The objectives underlying § 1738 are the further-
ance of federal-state comity and the conservation of judicial resourses. See Kremer, 456
U.S. at 467 n.6.
4. Under principles of claim preclusion (otherwise referred to as res judicata), a final
judgment on the merits precludes the parties or their privies from relitigating in a subse-
Loyola University Law Journal [Vol. 16
underlying premise of the current Court that an individual does
not have an unfettered right to a federal forum for the adjudication
of his federal claims. 6 Rather, the vindication of federal rights may
be entrusted to state courts with a concomitant savings in federal
resources.
7
Numerous commentators have been critical of the efforts to limit
the role of the federal judiciary in vindicating civil rights.' The
Kremer decision has been particularly criticized because it gives a
state judgment preclusive effect even where the state court did not
review the merits of the discrimination claim de novo.9 Thus, the
quent proceeding matters that were or could have been raised in the prior proceeding.
Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 94 (1980). Claim preclusion includes the common law
doctrines of merger and bar. In general, the principle of merger provides that when a
final judgment is rendered in favor of plaintiff, the plaintiff's claim is extinguished and
merged into the judgment. Plaintiff may then sue on the judgment, but he cannot sue
again on his claim. The principle of bar provides that when the defendant prevails on the
merits, the plaintiff's claim is extinguished and the judgment bars a subsequent action on
the claim. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS §§ 18, 19 (1982). But see Martin,
Restatement (Second) of Judgments: An Overview, 66 CORNELL L. REV. 404 (1981).
Professor Martin favors abandonment of the win/lose distinction and associates merger
with conservation of judicial resources and bar with the avoidance of inconsistent results.
Under principles of issue preclusion (otherwise referred to as collateral estoppel), once
a court decides an issue of law or fact necessary to a final judgment on the merits, that
judgment precludes relitigation of the same issue on a different claim between the same
parties or their privies. Montana v. United States, 440 U.S. 147, 153 (1979).
Both claim and issue preclusion give effect to the finality of judgment and thereby
"relieve parties of the cost and vexation of multiple lawsuits, conserve judicial resources,
and by preventing inconsistent decision, encourage reliance on adjudication." Allen v.
McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 94 (1980).
5. See, e.g., Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90 (1980); (issue preclusion applies in a 42
U.S.C. § 1983 action so as to foreclose a state criminal defendant from relitigating mat-
ters that were decided by a state court after a full and fair opportunity to litigate); Migra
v. Warren City School Dist. Bd. of Educ., 104 S. Ct. 892 (1984) (claim preclusion applies
in § 1983 action).
6. Allen, 449 U.S. at 103. In the Court's view, it is more important to give full faith
and credit to state court judgments than to ensure separate forums for federal and state
claims. Migra v. Warren City School Dist. Bd. of Educ., 104 S. Ct. 892, 897 (1984).
Stated otherwise, the litigant is not guaranteed a federal fact-finding forum for his federal
claims.
7. Allen, 449 U.S. at 105; Sumner v. Mata, 449 U.S. 539, 549 (1981). See generally
O'Connor, Trends in the Relationship between the Federal and State Courts from the Per-
spective of a State Court Judge, 22 WM. & MARY L. REV. 801, 813-15 (1981).
8. For the view that federal courts are more receptive to civil rights claims than state
courts, see generally Field, The Uncertain Nature of Federal Jurisdiction, 22 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 683 (1981); Neuborne, Toward Procedural Parity in Constitutional Litiga-
tion, 22 WM. & MARY L. REV. 725 (1981); Neuborne, The Myth of Parity, 90 HARV. L.
REV. 1105 (1977).
9. C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 4471 (Supp.
1984); Note, A Tragi-Comity: Kremer v. Chemical Construction Corp., 15 CONN. L. REV.
799, 816-17 (1983); Note, Kremer v. Chemical Construction Corp.: Federal-State Comity
in Employment Discrimination, 15 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 121 (1983); Note, Res Judicata,
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impact of Kremer may be not only to limit the role of the federal
courts in the adjudication of Title VII claims, but also to limit the
de novo adjudication of federal employment claims in any judicial
forum. I
The criticism of Kremer may, however, be overdrawn. The
Kremer decision is appealing on a policy level insofar as it seeks to
rationalize and make more efficient the somewhat cumbersome op-
eration of employment discrimination litigation, involving separate
federal and state administrative agencies and separate federal and
state judicial forums. Kremer is objectionable only if, in the pro-
Collateral Estoppel, and Title VII: Tool or Trap for the Unwary?, 62 NEB. L. REV. 384,
404-06 (1983); Note, Kremer v. Chemical Construction Corporation: Eviscerating Title
VII, 17 SUFFOLK L. REV. 987, 1017 (1983).
10. In his Kremer dissent, Justice Blackmun suggested the opposite result. He pre-
dicted that complainants would bypass review in state courts or possibly not even exhaust
state remedies in order to preserve the right to bring their Title VII claims in federal
court. Kremer, 456 U.S. at 504. Several commentators critical of the Kremer decision
have made similar predictions. See generally Mahoney, A Sword as Well as a Shield: The
Offensive Use of Collateral Estoppel in Civil Rights Litigation, 69 IOWA L. REV. 469, 479
(1984); Note, Kremer v. Chemical Construction Corp.: Federal-State Comity in Employ-
ment Discrimination, 15 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 121, 122-23 (1983).
To some extent, complainants may be consciously bypassing judicial review. See Jones
v. Progress Lighting Corp., 36 Fair Empi. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 25 (E.D. Pa. 1984); Snow v.
Nevada Dep't of Prisons, 543 F. Supp. 752 (D. Nev. 1982); Wiese v. Syracuse Univ., 553
F. Supp. 675 (N.D.N.Y. 1982) (since plaintiff had not appealed an adverse administrative
determination, Kremer rationale does not apply).
Justice Blackmun's prediction, however, is based on the premise that complainants will
tailor their litigation strategy to the Kremer opinion. That may very well be the case for
those who are represented by counsel. But many charging parties appear pro se before
state agencies. Kremer, for example, was not represented by counsel until he appeared
before the Second Circuit. These pro se complainants, in particular, are unaware of the
preclusive impact of their litigation decision until it is too late. For this reason, Black-
mun also suggests that the majority has constructed a trap for the pro se or poorly repre-
sented plaintiff. Kremer, 456 U.S. at 506.
11. Kremer is a case in point. Under New York's Human Rights Law, Kremer had
the initial option to process his charge with the New York State Division of Human
Rights ("NYHRD") or to forego his administrative remedies and seek direct judicial
redress. N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 297(9) (McKinney 1982). Under the New York statute,
however, once a party files his charge with the NYHRD, he is precluded from commenc-
ing a judicial action unless his charge is dismissed for administrative inconvenience. N.Y.
EXEC. LAW § 297(9) (McKinney 1982); see Emil v. Dewey, 49 N.Y.2d 968, 406 N.E.2d
744, 428 N.Y.S.2d 887 (1980). Furthermore, an adverse administrative determination by
the NYHRD is only subject to a deferential standard of review. N.Y. EXEC. LAW
§ 297(a) (McKinney 1982). Thus, once he chose to pursue his state claim with the
NYHRD, his only recourse with respect to his statutory rights was to exhaust his admin-
istrative remedies, and thereafter, seek judicial review if the agency rendered an adverse
determination. Consequently, Kremer's resort to state administrative remedies consti-
tuted a statutory election of remedies foreclosing his right to a full adjudication of his
state claim in state court. Then, by appealing the adverse administrative determination to
state court, he was also precluded, under the Kremer rationale, from a full adjudication of
his federal discrimination claim in federal court.
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cess of giving preclusive effect to state court judgments, the rights
Congress accorded employees in Title VII are diluted, either sub-
stantively or procedurally.
This article demonstrates that Kremer can be implemented in a
manner consistent with both the remedial purposes of Title VII
and the principles of comity that underlie section 1738. It is most
important, however, that Kremer not be improperly extended to
preclude complainants who did not affirmatively seek state court
redress. Thus, where the state reviewing court reverses an admin-
istrative determination favorable to the employee, and it is the em-
ployer who sought judicial review, the Kremer rationale should not
apply. Otherwise, the prospective Title VII claimant would be
stripped of his statutory right to opt for a de novo judicial determi-
nation, in contravention of Congress's express intent.
This article will give an overview of Title VII's procedural
scheme and review the Kremer decision itself. It will then proceed
to illustrate how the federal courts should implement Kremer when
confronted with a preclusion defense. Finally, it will discuss how
Kremer, properly interpreted, can lead to an effective meshing of
federal and state employment discrimination remedies.
II. THE TITLE VII PROCEDURAL SCHEME
Title VII makes unlawful employment discrimination based on
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.1 2 Its enactment in
1964 marked the first comprehensive attempt by Congress to rec-
tify the pernicious effects of employment discrimination on a na-
tional level. 3 Although other federal remedies existed prior to
1964,' 4 an employee who thought he had been discriminated
against had to rely primarily on a crazy-quilt of state fair employ-
ment practice statutes that varied in the scope of their protection
and the remedies available.15 Even in those states with legislation,
enforcement was often hampered by "inadequate legislation, inade-
12. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(l) (1982).
13. The Supreme Court has referred to Title VII as a "complex legislative design
directed at a historic evil of national proportions." Albermarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422
U.S. 405, 416 (1975).
14. See, e.g., National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-87 (1982); Railway
Labor Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-88 (1982); Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1)
(1982); 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1982). See generally M. SOVERN, LEGAL RESTRAINTS ON
RACIAL DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT (1966).
15. At the time Title VII was enacted, approximately one-half of the fifty states had
fair employment statutes. 110 CONG. REC. 7203 (1964) (remarks of Senator Joseph
Clark).
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quate procedures, or inadequate budget."16
As important as Title VII was to become in combating employ-
ment discrimination, it was never intended to be an exclusive rem-
edy. In Congress's view, the most effective way to eradicate the
harmful effects of employment discrimination was to permit paral-
lel and overlapping remedies whereby an individual could pursue
independently his rights under other applicable state and federal
statutes.1 7  Accordingly, just as proposals to defer completely to
states with effective fair employment statutes were defeated, 8 so
were attempts to make Title VII an exclusive federal remedy. 19
Thus, while an aggrieved employee can resort to Title VII's sub-
stantive protection, Title VII was not intended to supplant other
statutes; rather, it supplements existing rights, and, in effect, serves
16. Id. at 7205, reprinted in 1 EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION,
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF TITLE VII AND XI OF CIVIL RIGHTS AcT OF 1964, at 3344
(1968) [hereinafter cited as "1964 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY"]. See generally Bonfield, An
Institutional Analysis of the Agencies Administering Fair Employment Practices Laws
(Part I), 42 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1035 (1967).
17. Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 47-49 (1974). For example, Sen-
ator Clark, one of the sponsors of the bill, introduced an interpretive memorandum
which stated: "[T]itle VII is not intended to and does not deny to any individual, rights
and remedies which he may pursue under other Federal and State statutes." Similarly, in
1972 Senator Javits, one of the managers of the 1972 amendments to Title VII, quoted
with approval a statement by a representative of the U.S. Department of Justice:
In the field of civil rights, the Congress has regularly insured that there be a
variety of enforcement devices to insure that all available resources are brought
to bear on problems of discrimination. . . . At this juncture, when we are all
agreed that some improvement in the enforcement of Title VII is needed, it
would be. . . unwise to diminish in any way the variety of enforcement means
available to deal with discrimination in employment.
118 CONG. REC. 3369-70 (1972).
18. The original House version of the bill gave exclusive jurisdiction to those states
that were adequately combating employment discrimination. The Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") was to have the authority to determine the ade-
quacy of state agency procedures. If they were found to be adequate, the EEOC was
directed to enter into written agreements with the state agency. In such states, individu-
als could not bring Title VII claims in federal court. H.R. 7152, 88th Cong., 2d Sess.,
§ 708(b) (1963). The Senate rejected this approach and provided for the limited deferral
to state agencies, which was finally adopted. 110 CONG. REC. 12817 (1964).
19. In 1964 Congress rejected an amendment that would have made Title VII the
exclusive federal remedy for employment discrimination. 110 CONG. REC. 13,650-52
(1964), reprinted in 1964 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 16, at 3321-25. Similarly,
another attempt to make Title VII the exclusive federal remedy for employment discrimi-
nation was defeated in 1972. See H.R. Rep. No. 238, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 17, reprinted in
part in 1972 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2137, 2181-82 (1972) (House version pro-
viding that Title VII be exclusive remedy was withdrawn); 3 EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OP-
PORTUNITY COMMISSION, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF EQUAL EMPLOYMENT
OPPORTUNITY AcT OF 1972, at 1382-1407 [hereinafter cited as "1972 LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY"].
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as a national floor of protection.2 °
To enforce Title VII, Congress devised an intricate interplay of
state and federal administrative and judicial remedies. In an at-
tempt to encourage conciliation of disputes, Congress conditionedjudicial redress on initial resort to administrative remedies. 21 Prior
to commencing a Title VII action in court, a complainant must file
a timely charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commis-
sion ("EEOC").22 Upon receipt of the charge, the EEOC is au-
20. See Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 48-49 (1974) ("Title VII was
designed to supplement, rather than supplant existing laws and institutions relating to
employment discrimination.").
Many state fair employment statutes are broader than Title VII in terms of the classes
they protect, and the remedies they provide. In addition to prohibiting discrimination on
the bases of sex, race, religion or ethnic origin, as Title VII does, many state statutes
prohibit discrimination based on: (1) marital status (e.g., CAL. GOV'T CODE § 12940
(West 1980 & Supp. 1984); N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 296 (McKinney 1982)); (2) sexual prefer-
ence (e.g., D.C. CODE ANN. § 1-2512(a) (1981)); or (3) history of treatment of mental
disorders (e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 151B, § 4(9A) (Michie/Law. Co-op. 1976)).
With respect to relief available, the prevailing Title VII claimant is limited to equitable
relief which usually takes the form of reinstatement and/or back pay (42 U.S.C. § 2000e-
5g (1982)) and reasonable attorney's fees (42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5k (1982)). State statutory
schemes, in contrast, may allow recovery of compensatory damages. See, e.g., FLA.
STAT. § 725.07 (1984); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 37.2801 (West Supp. 1984); N.Y.
EXEC. LAW § 297(4)(c)(iii) (McKinney 1982). State law may provide for recovery for
mental anguish, pain and suffering (see Moll v. Parkside Livonia Credit Union, 525 F.
Supp. 786 (E.D. Mich. 1981)), and out-of-pocket expenses (cf. Sarantis v. New York
State Div. of Human Resources, 41 A.D.2d 885, 342 N.Y.S.2d 594 (1973)). See generally
Wald, Alternatives to Title VII. State Statutory and Common Law Remedies for Employ-
ment Discrimination, 5 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 35 (1982).
Not all state fair employment practice statutes, however, provide as much relief as
Title VII. See TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-16(2) (Vernon 1980) (limited to
injunctive relief); GA. CODE ANN. § 89-1716(i) (1980) (attorney's fees not recoverable).
Notwithstanding the vagaries of state law, either in terms of the protection afforded or
the effectiveness of enforcement, a covered employee, wherever he works, is guaranteed
the substantive protection of Title VII and a fairly uniform procedure of enforcement
within the federal system.
21. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e) (1982).
22. The charge must identify the parties involved and describe generally the com-
plained of acts or practices. EEOC Procedural Regulations, 29 C.F.R. § 1601.12(b)
(1984). The filing requirement mandates that the complainant file the charge within 180
days of the alleged discriminatory practice. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e) (1982). This time
period is extended to 300 days in deferral states, that is, states that have enacted their
own employment discrimination statute and have established agencies to grant adequate
relief. Id. The 300 day time period, however, is somewhat deceiving. In a deferral state,
the complainant must wait 60 days or until the state fair employment practice agency
completes its determination (whichever is earlier) before filing is effective with the EEOC.
Because of the 60-day waiting period in deferral states, the filing requirement with the
EEOC is effectively reduced to 240 days. Mohasco Corp. v. Silver, 447 U.S. 807 (1980).
See generally C. SULLIVAN, M. ZIMMER & R. RICHARDS, FEDERAL STATUTORY LAW
OF EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION, 265-361 (1980)
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thorized to begin its investigation. It may (1) dismiss the charge,23
(2) make a determination that there is no reasonable cause to be-
lieve that Title VII was violated, or (3) make a determination of
reasonable cause, in which case it will attempt conciliation.24 If the
EEOC dismisses the charge or finds no reasonable cause, it issues a
right-to-sue letter authorizing the charging party to commence a
civil action. The charging party, however, need not wait until the
EEOC completes its investigation or concilation attempts; rather,
he is entitled to a right-to-sue letter no later than 180 days after
effective filing with the EEOC.26 Thus, Congress guaranteed that
regardless of the EEOC's disposition of the charge, the complain-
ant has a right to a de novo judicial determination of his Title VII
claim.
To encourage states to develop their own effective remedies
against employment discrimination and in the interest of comity,
Congress created an additional procedural layer in Title VII's en-
forcement scheme. In those states that have their own employ-
ment discrimination statutes and agencies to grant adequate and
effective relief, filing with the EEOC is conditioned on filing with
the appropriate state or local agency. 27 The state or local agency is
thus given the initial, albeit limited, opportunity to resolve the dis-
pute under state discrimination law. The EEOC, however, is au-
thorized to commence its own processing of the charge either sixty
days after state filing or on termination of state proceedings,
whichever occurs first.28
Since completion of state proceedings will rarely occur within
sixty days, 29 it is complainant's option after the sixty-day period to
continue to press his state claim before the state agency and/or go
before the EEOC with his Title VII charge.3" Under Title VII's
23. Among other reasons, the charge may be dismissed if it is not filed on a timely
basis, if the charging party does not cooperate with the EEOC, or if he cannot be located.
EEOC Procedural Regulations, 29 C.F.R. § 1601.19(a), (c), (d) (1984).
24. EEOC Procedural Regulations, 29 C.F.R. § 1601.19-21 (1984).
25. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(l)(3) (1982). The charging party must commence his civil
action within 90 days of receipt of the right-to-sue letter. 42 U.S.C. § 200Oe-5(f)(1)
(1982).
26. EEOC Procedure Regulations, 29 C.F.R. § 1601.28(a)(1) (1984).
27. The complainant in a deferral state may file his charge directly with the state
agency or with the EEOC which will then refer it to the local agency. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-
5(c), (d) (1982).
28. EEOC Procedural Regulations, 29 C.F.R. § 1601.13(b) (1984).
29. In New York Gaslight Club, Inc. v. Carey, 447 U.S. 54, 66 n.6 (1980), the
Supreme Court indicated that few states could provide complete relief from discrimina-
tory practices even within 240 days of filing the charge.
30. If the complainant's remedies are broader under state law, he will often proceed
1985]
Loyola University Law Journal
procedural scheme, he is not required to exhaust state administra-
tive remedies as a condition to seeking relief under Title VII. 1
In sorting out the interplay of state and federal remedies, the
Supreme Court had made it clear, prior to Kremer, that an individ-
ual could seek redress in several forums and still be guaranteed a
federal trial de novo of his Title VII rights. Specifically, the Court
held that submission of a discrimination claim to binding arbitra-
tion pursuant to a collective bargaining agreement did not affect
one's right to a de novo determination under Title VII's procedural
scheme.3 2 As the Court stated, an individual had substantive and
procedural rights under Title VII, aside from his contractual
rights, that he could exercise at his option. Similarly, a person
could exhaust his state or local administrative remedies without
waiving his Title VII rights, including the enforcement procedures
contained in the statute."3 Even within Title VII's own procedural
scheme, exhaustion of federal administrative remedies left an indi-
vidual's right to resort to the federal courts unimpaired. 31 In es-
sence, the Court considered the federal judiciary to be the ultimate
enforcers of Title VII. 3' Accordingly, it concluded that findings of
no employment discrimination by non-judicial factfinding bodies
did not deprive the individual of a de novo determination of his
Title VII rights by the federal courts. The question before the
Court in Kremer, however, was whether a state judicial determina-
tion of no employment discrimination under state law barred a
complainant from pressing his Title VII rights in the federal
system. 3 6
with his state remedies. If he does not get adequate state redress, the typical complainant
usually then resorts to his federal remedies.
31. EEOC Procedural Regulations, 29 C.F.R. § 1601.13(b)(2)(iii) (1984).
32. Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 59-60 (1974).
33. See Chandler v. Roudebush, 425 U.S. 840, 844-45 (1976); Alexander v. Gardner-
Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 47-48 (1974); cf Oscar Mayer & Co. v. Evans, 441 U.S. 750
(1979) (Court interpreted similar deferral provision under the Age Discrimination Em-
ployment Act, 29 U.S.C. § 633(b) (1976), to allow federal trial de novo following state
agency determination).
34. McDonnell-Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 799 (1973) (federal trial de
novo required after EEOC determination of no reasonable cause to believe discrimination
claim); Chandler v. Roudebush, 425 U.S. 840, 844-45 (1976).
35. E.g., Alexander v. Gardner-Denver, 415 U.S. 36 (1974).
36. Several commentators had examined the issues subsequently resolved in Kremer.
See Jackson, Matheson & Piskorski, The Proper Role of Res Judicata and Collateral Es-
toppel in Title VII Suits, 79 MICH. L. REV. 1485 (1981); Note, Res Judicata in Successive
Employment Discrimination Suits, 1980 U. ILL. L.F. 1049.
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III. THE KREMER DECISION
A. The Majority and Dissenting Opinions
The plaintiff in Kremer filed a Title VII employment discrimina-
tion charge with the EEOC alleging that he had been discriminated
against on the basis of his national origin and religion.3 7 Pursuant
to the deferral provision of Title VII,38 the EEOC referred the
charge to the New York State Division of Human Rights
("NYHRD") which was responsible for enforcing New York's law
prohibiting employment discrimination. Kremer maintained
before the NYHRD that he had been discriminated against on the
basis of his age and religion. Specifically, Kremer contended that
his discharge from his position as an engineer and the subsequent
failure to be rehired were because of his age and Jewish faith.39
After a preliminary investigation, the NYHRD found no probable
cause to believe that the employer had engaged in the discrimina-
tory practices alleged by Kremer." The agency's determination
was upheld by its appeal board as neither arbitrary, capricious, nor
an abuse of discretion.4' Undaunted by the loss of his appeal
within the state agency, Kremer returned to press his Title VII
rights before the EEOC. At the same time, however, he petitioned
the state court of New York to set aside the adverse state agency
determination. Without reviewing the claim de novo, the state
court upheld the agency's determination that there had been no
unlawful discrimination under state law. At this juncture, Kremer
received his right-to-sue letter from the EEOC and commenced a
Title VII action in federal district court alleging discrimination on
the basis of national origin and religion.42 The Supreme Court, in a
5-4 decision, held that principles of preclusion 43 barred Kremer
from asserting his Title VII claim in federal district court.
37. Kremer v. Chemical Constr. Corp., 456 U.S. 461 (1982).
38. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(c) (1982). Title VII gives states with fair employment agen-
cies the initial opportunity to resolve employment discrimination claims. Accordingly,
even if a charge is first filed with the EEOC, the EEOC cannot process the charge; it must
wait until 60 days after referral to the state agency or termination of state proceedings,
whichever occurs first. See supra notes 22, 27 and accompanying text.
39. On the state agency level, Kremer did not charge discrimination on thu basis of
national origin. Yet, for purposes of issue preclusion, the Supreme Court considered the
national origin claim under Title VII to be the same as his religious claim under state law.
Kremer, 456 U.S. at 465 n.4.
40. Id. at 464.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 465.
43. There was some confusion over whether the Court applied state law principles of
claim or issue preclusion in Kremer. See infra notes 69-78 and accompanying text.
1985]
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As the Court noted, section 1738 requires federal courts to give
the same preclusive effect to state court judgments that the judg-
ments would have in the state rendering the judgment.4 It was
apparently undisputed that under New York law, Kremer would
be precluded from relitigating his state discrimination claim in
state court.45 Accordingly, Kremer maintained that (1) Congress,
in enacting Title VII, intended to modify the statutory obligation
that federal courts grant full faith and credit to state court deci-
sions; and (2) the state proceedings were so lacking in procedural
due process that their determination should not be given preclusive
effect.46
In the Court's view, there was no "clear and manifest intent"
that Congress in passing Title VII abrogated the "historic respect
44. Kremer, 456 U.S. at 488-89; Union & Planters' Bank v. Memphis, 189 U.S. 71, 75
(1903). Some commentators have maintained that § 1738 represents only the minimum
full faith and credit a federal court must give a prior state judgment. Thus, even if the
state of rendition would not give preclusive effect to its own judgments, the federal court,
pursuant to common law doctrines of claim and issue preclusion, may give it greater
preclusive effect than the state. See generally C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 9,
§ 4467, at 644-47; Casad, Intersystem Issue Preclusion and the Restatement (Second) of
Judgments, 66 CORNELL L. REV. 510 (1981); Jackson, Matheson & Piskorski, The
Proper Role of Res Judicata and Collateral Estoppel in Title VII Suits, 79 MICH. L. REV.
1485, 1512-14 (1981); Vestal, Res Judicata/Preclusion by Judgment: The Law Applied in
Federal Courts, 66 MICH. L. REV. 1723 (1968).
Since according greater deference gives the state judgment at least the deference ac-
corded by the state's own courts, it may be argued that greater deference does not under-
mine the notions of comity embodied in § 1738. The greatest objection against this view
focuses on the situation where the rendering state adheres to mutuality of issue preclusion
and the federal court does not. Can the federal court give the judgment greater preclusive
effect than the rendering state would? The argument is made that a person who proceeds
in state court should be able to rely on the preclusion rules of that state; accordingly, to
give a state judgment greater preclusion than the rendering state would not only violate
notions of comity, but it would also be violative of due process. See generally C. WRIGHT
& A. MILLER, supra note 9, § 4467, at 467-68; Currie, Res Judicata: The Neglected De-
fense, 45 U. CHI. L. REv. 317 (1978); Degnan, Federalized Res Judicata, 85 YALE L.J.
741, 773 (1976).
The Supreme Court has recently rejected the notion that the federal courts can accord
state judgments greater preclusive effect than would the rendering state. Marrese v.
American Academy of Orthopaedic Surgeons, 53 U.S.L.W. 4265, 4267-68 (U.S. Mar. 5,
1985) (even with respect to claims that are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the federal
courts, the federal courts must first look to state law to determine the preclusive effect of
a prior state judgment on a litigant's federal claim); Haring v. Prosise, 103 S. Ct. 2368,
2373 n.6 (1983).
45. Under New York's statutory scheme, the complainant has the initial option of
resorting to his administrative remedies or seeking direct judicial redress. But once a
complainant proceeds with his administrative remedies, his choice constitutes an election
of remedies, thereby precluding him from commencing a civil action on his claim. N.Y.
EXEC. LAW § 297(9) (McKinney 1982); Emil v. Dewey, 49 N.Y.2d 968, 406 N.E.2d 744,
428 N.Y.S.2d 887 (1980).
46. Kremer, 456 U.S. at 467-68.
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that federal courts accord state court judgments."47 The majority
initially considered the Title VII provision that permits a party to
bring a civil action if the EEOC finds no reasonable cause. While it
may be true that an aggrieved party is entitled to a de novo trial
following an EEOC determination, the provision does not imply
that a final judgment of a state court is subject to a redetermina-
tion.48 Nor did the provision directing the EEOC to give "substan-
tial weight" to findings made in state proceedings reflect a
modification of section 1738." Rather, the majority interpreted
the "substantial weight" requirement as a minimum level of defer-
ence that the EEOC must accord all state proceedings, including
administrative proceedings.5 0 The provision was to guarantee that
the EEOC consider state agency determinations, not to lessen what
would otherwise be the preclusive effect of a final state judgment.5I
In the majority's view, the interests of comity and federalism
embodied in section 1738 would be furthered by the application of
preclusion principles in Title VII actions. Moreover, such applica-
tion would be consistent with the statutory scheme of Title VII
itself. The drafters of Title VII sought to strengthen the states' role
in combating employment discrimination by giving the states the
initial opportunity to resolve discrimination charges. Depriving fi-
nal state judgments preclusive effect would reduce the incentive for
effective state and local enforcement schemes, thereby undercut-
ting the purpose of Title VII's deferral scheme. 2
The Court also rejected the contention that New York's admin-
istrative proceedings and judicial review were so lacking in proce-
dural due process that the state judgment should not be given
preclusive effect under section 1738. For purposes of section 1738,
state proceedings need only meet minimum due process stan-
47. Id. at 471-72. Since the federal courts' obligation to accord full faith and credit to
state judgments is statutory, not constitutional (see supra note 3), Congress has the power
to modify its application, either expressly or by implication. In Kremer, however, the
Court reaffirmed its position that modification by implication is disfavored. Id. at 468.
Accord Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 97-98 (1980); Migra v. Warren City School Dist.
Bd. of Educ., 104 S. Ct. 892 (1984).
48. Kremer, 456 U.S. at 469-70.
49. In 1972 Congress amended Title VII to require the EEOC to accord substantial
weight to the findings reached in state proceedings when determining whether a charge is
supported by reasonable cause. Prior to Kremer, most circuits which addressed the ques-
tion interpreted the term "state proceedings" to include state judicial proceedings. E.g.,
Smouse v. General Elec. Co., 626 F.2d 333 (3d Cir. 1980).
50. Kremer, 456 U.S. at 470.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 478.
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dards.53 According to the Court, these standards were amply met
by the New York administrative and court proceedings. Those
provisions which guaranteed the claimant a full and fair opportu-
nity to litigate his claim included, among others, the right to pres-
ent evidence on the record, to call and cross-examine witnesses, to
be represented by an attorney, and to ask the division to issue
subpoenas.54
While the majority stated it was giving preclusive effect to a state
court judgment, it clearly reaffirmed prior decisions that unre-
viewed state administrative determinations would not have such
preclusive effect." Under the Kremer rationale, then, neither an
initial resort to a state's fair employment practices agency ("FEP
agency"), nor an agency determination on his state claim, will de-
prive the complainant of a trial de novo in federal court of his Title
VII rights. Only a state court decision will have preclusive effect.56
The state court, however, need not have decided the discrimination
issues de novo.
The dissenting opinion of Justice Blackmun disputed the major-
ity's conclusion that Congress, in drafting Title VII, did not intend
to modify the effect of section 1738. In his view, when Congress
directed the EEOC to give state proceedings "substantial weight,"
the term "proceedings" included judicial as well as administrative
"proceedings. 51 8 Accordingly, Congress did not intend state judi-
cial proceedings to have preclusive effect. Moreover, section
706(c) of Title VII specifically states that the complainant may
bring a Title VII suit in federal court despite the conclusion of state
53. Id. at 481.
54. It was irrelevant for preclusion purposes that Kremer had not availed himself of
all these procedural rights; the critical question was whether they were available.
55. Kremer, 456 U.S. at 469-70 & n.7.
56. The Court reasoned that since an EEOC determination did not preclude a trial de
novo in federal court, an unreviewed state administrative determination could not have
preclusive effect even if the state were to give it preclusive effect in its own courts. Id. at
470 n.7. Thus, neither an agency's reasonable cause determination nor a determination
after a full administrative hearing will have preclusive effect with respect to one's Title
VII claim. See infra notes 85, 86 and accompanying text.
57. Kremer, 456 U.S. at 461. Justice Brennan and Justice Marshall joined this opin-
ion. Justice Stevens also dissented from the Court's decision, but on a different basis. He
concurred with the majority's view that Congress, in enacting Title VII, did not intend to
modify § 1738 with respect to Title VII claims. Nevertheless, he thought Congress had
intended claimants to have at least one opportunity to have a trial de novo in court on
their discrimination claim. Since, in his view, the New York reviewing court had not
determined the facts de novo, Kremer was still entitled to a trial de novo on the discrimi-
nation issues raised by him. Accordingly, if the state court had heard the case de novo,
Justice Stevens would have given the state judgment preclusive effect. Id. at 511.
58. Id. at 488 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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proceedings.5 9 Once again, Blackmun viewed state court review of
an agency determination as part of the term "proceedings."
60
Thus, Congress assumed that the complainant could bring a Title
VII claim in federal court after state court review of an agency
determination.
Even assuming that section 1738 was not modified by Title VII,
Justice Blackmun concluded that the state reviewing court had not
made a determination of the discrimination issue before the federal
court. Under New York state law, the reviewing court did not
examine the facts de novo; rather, it applied a deferential standard
of review.6 ' In effect, the state court did not address the merits of
the discrimination charge; it merely decided that the agencies deci-
sion in finding no probable cause was neither arbitrary nor capri-
cious. Thus, the merit of the discrimination claim before the
federal court was not resolved by the state court.62
Rather, as Justice Blackmun stressed, the only state proceeding
to address the merits of the claim was that of the state agency.63 In
view of the deferential standard of review, it was really the state
agency's determination and not that of the state court that the
Kremer majority was according preclusive effect. 64 Yet, as the ma-
jority conceded, Title VII permits a trial de novo in federal court
notwithstanding an adverse state agency decision. Thus, the
59. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(c) (1982).
60. Kremer, 456 U.S. at 490 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
61. Id. at 491 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
62. In essence, the employee in the state court had a heavier burden of persuasion
than he had in federal court. Before the state reviewing court he had to establish that
there was no substantial evidence in the record or that the agency acted in an arbitrary or
capricious manner. If he had been permitted to assert his Title VII rights de novo in
federal court, he would merely have to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that he
was discriminated against. Although a different burden of persuasion in the first and
second forums militates against granting the first judgment preclusive effect, the Court
did not consider whether the state would apply such an exception since New York had a
statutory election of remedies provision. See supra note 11. The election of remedies
provision allows an individual to process his or her charge with the NYHRD or to forego
the administrative remedy and seek direct judicial redress.
63. Kremer, 456 U.S. at 491 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). In his view, the effect of
Kremer was to make the state administrative forum the exclusive remedy for employment
discrimination when Congress clearly intended that there be overlapping state and federal
remedies.
64. Id. at 493 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Justice Blackmun's view is in accord with
the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS' position that judicial review is part of the
administrative process. Affirmance of an agency decision is a factor that gives the agency
determination greater force for preclusion purposes, but it is still the agency determina-
tion that is being given preclusive effect. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 83
(1982) (fact that agency determination was upheld by judicial tribunal is a factor that
supports giving it preclusive effect).
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Kremer decision, in his view, directly contravened the express in-
tent of Congress to provide for a judicial determination of one's
Title VII rights subsequent to an administrative determination.
According to Justice Blackmun, one effect of the Kremer deci-
sions would be to frustrate Congress's intent to strengthen state
enforcement schemes.65 For, after Kremer, a complainant will be
encouraged to forego state court review of state agency decisions in
order to preserve his or her right to a trial de novo in federal court.
With such a reduction in court review, he predicted that the qual-
ity of the agency decisionmaking process would deteriorate. In-
deed, a litigant may avoid exhaustion of state administrative
remedies altogether for fear that even a favorable ruling may be
appealed by the employer thereby precluding access to federal
court.66 Moreover, he predicted that the Kremer ruling would be-
come a trap for the unwary. Many charging parties proceed at the
state agency level on a pro se basis.67 Unaware of the sophisticated
legal prinicples of preclusion, they may not realize that by exhaust-
ing their state remedies, they will be foreclosing their right to a
trial de novo of their Title VII claim.68 Such a result only under-
mines Congress's commitment to eradicate discrimination in the
workplace.
B. The Scope of the Kremer Rationale
Among the reasons the Kremer decision has attracted much
comment is the ambiguity in the Court's opinion. For example,
even the federal courts themselves have been divided over whether
the Kremer decision was based on application of state principles of
issue preclusion or claim preclusion. 69 The distinction between
65. Kremer, 456 U.S. at 498 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
66. Id. at 504 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Arguably, a proper interpretation of the
majority's result would not allow this. See infra notes 209-33 and accompanying text.
67. Id. at 506.
68. The Supreme Court, however, has stated that preclusion principles are not to be
over-ridden by public policy or manifest injustice considerations. Federated Dep't
Stores, Inc. v. Moitie, 452 U.S. 394 (1981).
69. Compare Gonsalves v. Alpine Country Club, 727 F.2d 27 (1st Cir. 1984) and
Loudermill v. Cleveland Bd. of Educ., 721 F.2d 550 (6th Cir. 1983) (Kremer claim pre-
clusion), aff'd, 53 U.S.L.W. 4306 (U.S. Mar. 19, 1985) with Unger v. Consol. Food Corp.,
693 F.2d 703 (7th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 1801 (1983) and Warren v. McCall,
709 F.2d 1183 (7th Cir. 1983) (Kremer issue preclusion).
Much of the disagreement has been because of the ambiguous language of the Court
itself. At one point, it suggested that claim preclusion was involved. Specifically, it
stated in footnote 22:
While our previous expressions of the requirement of a full and fair opportunity
to litigate have been in the context of collateral estoppel or issue preclusion, it is
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claim and issue preclusion is important in order to ascertain the
effect a prior judgment will have. Under issue preclusion, a final
judgment on the merits precludes a party or his privy from reliti-
gating factual or legal issues that were actually decided and neces-
sary to the prior judgment.70 Claim preclusion, in contrast, bars
the relitigation of the same claim. 71 A claim, moreover, does not
simply consist of those rights arising under a single statute or the-
ory of relief. The modem transactional definition of a claim in-
cludes all theories of relief that arise from a common core of
operative facts.72 Accordingly, claim preclusion bars litigation of
clear from what follows that invocation of res judicata or claim preclusion is
subject to the same limitation. . . . Resjudicata has recently been taken to bar
claims arising from the same transaction even if brought under different statutes
Kremer, 456 U.S. at 481-82 n.22.
The Court went on, however, to rest its decision on issue preclusion:
It may be that petitioner would be precluded under res judicata from pursuing a
Title VII claim. However that may be, it is undebatable that petitionor is at
least estopped from relitigating the issue of employment discrimination arising
from the same events.
Id. at 482 n.22.
70. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 27 (1982). See generally lB MOORE,
FEDERAL PRACTICE §§ 0.441-0.448 (1983); C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER supra note 9, at
§§ 4416-26.
71. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS §§ 18, 19 (1982). Under common law
principles of merger, once a party obtains a valid and final personal judgment his claim is
extinguished and merged into the judgment; thereafter, he can only maintain an action on
the judgment. Under common law principles of bar, a valid final judgment for the de-
fendant bars plaintiff from maintaining another action on the same claim. See generally
A. VESTAL, RES JUDICATA/PRECLUSION chs. 4-6 (1969).
72. Section 24 of the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS (1982) provides:
(1) When a valid and final judgment rendered in an action extinguishes the
plaintiff's claim pursuant to the rules of merger or bar (see §§ 18, 19), the claim
extinguished includes all rights of the plaintiff to remedies against the defendant
with respect to all or any part of the transaction, or series of connected transac-
tions, out of which the action arose.
(2) What factual grouping constitutes a "transaction," and what groupings
constitute a "series," are to be determined pragmatically, giving weight to such
considerations as whether the facts are related in time, space, origin, or motiva-
tion, whether they form a convenient trial unit, and whether their treatment as
a unit conforms to the parties' expectations or business understanding or usage.
Comment a to § 24 states:
The present trend is to see claim in factual terms and to make it coterminous
with the transaction regardless of the number of substantive theories, or variant
forms of relief flowing from those theories, that may be available to the plaintiff;
regardless of the number of primary rights that may have been invaded; and
regardless of the variations in the evidence needed to support the theories of
rights. The transaction is the basis of the litigative unit or entity which may not
be split.
Many states apply the transactional view of claim preclusion. E.g., Schneider v. Colegio
de Abogados de Puerto Rico, 546 F. Supp. 1251, 1272 (D.P.R. 1982); Morris v. Union
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all matters that were or could have been raised in the proper pro-
ceeding, not just matters that were actually decided. To some ex-
tent, then, the effect of claim preclusion is broader, and
consequently the repercussion greater, than that under issue
preclusion.73
Despite some confusion in the opinion, the Kremer holding itself
rests on state law principles of issue preclusion as applied by the
federal courts through operation of section 1738. Specifically, the
Court concluded that Kremer's allegation under state law that he
had been discriminated against on the basis of national origin was
the same as his allegation under Title VII that he was discrimi-
nated against because he was Jewish. Since the prior state proceed-
ing had determined the legal issue of discrimination, he was
precluded from relitigating that issue in federal court, just as he
would have been precluded from relitigating the issue under state
law.74
Although Kremer did not decide specifically whether section
1738 mandates federal courts in a Title VII action to give the same
claim preclusion effect to a state judgment as the rendering state
would, 7 its rationale appears to apply to claim as well as to issue
preclusion.7 6 The Court held that nothing in the language or legis-
Oil Co. of California, 96 Ill. App. 3d 148, 157, 421 N.E.2d 278, 285 (1981); Kradoska v.
Kipp, 397 A.2d 562, 569 (Me. 1979); MacKintosh v. Chambers, 285 Mass. 594, 596, 190
N.E. 38, 40 (1934).
Other states still apply a narrower test. E.g., Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Echhardt,
691 F.2d 245 (6th Cir. 1982) (Ohio law is that determination of two distinct claims de-
pends on whether different proofs are required to sustain the claims); Harth v. United
Ins. Co., 266 S.C. 1, 221 S.E.2d 102 (1975) (both involve the same primary right of the
plaintiff and duty of the defendant); Griggs v. Griggs, 214 S.C. 177, 184, 51 S.E.2d 622,
626 (1949) (common evidence required).
73. Brown v. Felsen, 442 U.S. 127, 132 (1979) ("Because res judicata may govern
grounds and defenses not previously litigated, however, it blockades unexplored paths
that may lead to truth. For the sake of repose, res judicata shields fraud and the cheat as
well as the honest person. It therefore is to be invoked only after careful inquiry.").
74. Kremer, 456 U.S. at 479 n.20; see also Marrese v. American Academy of
Orthopaedic Surgeons, 53 U.S.L.W. 4265, 4267 (U.S. Mar. 5, 1985) (that Kremer repre-
sented the application of state issue preclusion principles).
75. In Kremer, the issues arising under the state and federal statutes were identical
and actually litigated and determined. Accordingly, it was not necessary to determine
whether claim preclusion was applicable in a Title VII action. If, in his state proceeding,
Kremer had failed to raise his national origin/religion-based discrimination charge,
though he had the opportunity to do so, the Supreme Court would have had to address
the claim preclusion question.
76. In Migra v. Warren City School Dist. Bd. of Educ., 104 S. Ct. 892, 898 (1984),
the Court indicated that the test for repeal of § 1738 by implication would be the same
with respect to the issue and claim preclusion. In Migra the Court was asked to decide
whether a prior state judgment has claim preclusion effect, as well as issue preclusion
effect, in federal § 1983 actions. Writing for the entire Conrt D -... --
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lative history of Title VII reflected a congressional intent to par-
tially repeal section 1738. If section 1738 remains in full force and
effect with respect to Title VII actions, the state's total preclusion
rules should apply absent a countervailing federal policy expressed
in the statute itself.77  Indeed, lower federal courts have applied
"If § 1738 created an exception to the general preclusive effect accorded to state judg-
ments, such an exception would seem to require similar treatment of both issue preclu-
sion and claim preclusion. Having rejected in Allen the view that state court judgments
have no issue preclusive effect in § 1983 suits, we must reject the view that § 1983 pre-
vents the judgment in petitioner's state court proceeding from creating a claim preclusion
bar in this case." Id. at 898. See generally C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 9,
§ 4471, at 110 (Supp. 1984) (state claim preclusion principles apply).
77. It has been suggested that § 1738 should not apply where the federal courts have
exclusive jurisdiction of the federal claim. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS
§ 26(l)(c) comment c, illustration 2 (1982); Atwood, State Court Judgments in Federal
Litigation Mapping the Contours of Full Faith and Credit, 58 IND. L.J. 59, 104 (1983).
The grant of exclusive jurisdiction, it is argued, reflects congressional intent to modify the
mandate of § 1738. Brown v. Felsen, 442 U.S. 127 (1979) (in view of Congress's intent to
vest exclusive jurisdiction over the matter at bar to bankruptcy court, claim preclusion
does not apply to earlier state judgment involving same debt). Thus, if the federal courts
have exclusive jurisdiction over Title VII, a question the Supreme Court has not yet
resolved, one might argue that the federal courts need not accord the same preclusive
effect as the state courts would. In Kremer, however, the Court rejected such reasoning
with respect to issue preclusion. In the majority's view, § 1738 applied regardless of
whether federal courts have exclusive or concurrent jurisdiction over Title VII claims.
Kremer, 456 U.S. at 506 n.20.
Since the rendering state would have accorded the judgment against Kremer issue
preclusive effect and since Congress had not impliedly repealed § 1738, the federal court
was bound to apply the same issue preclusive effect as would the rendering state.
Recently, the Supreme Court has held that the Kremer approach applies equally to the
application of claim preclusion principles with respect to claims within the exclusive ju-
risdiction of the federal courts. Marrese v. American Academy of Orthopaedic Surgeons,
53 U.S.L.W. 4265 (U.S. Mar. 5, 1985). In Marrese, plaintiffs asserted a federal antitrust
claim in a federal action even though they had had the opportunity to raise a comparable
state antitrust claim in a prior state court action. The threshold question was whether
§ 1738 was applicable at all. The Seventh Circuit reasoned that since the state courts had
no jurisdiction to hear federal antitrust claims, the claimed preclusive effect of the state
proceeding had to be determined by federal preclusion principles and not by those of the
rendering state, as § 1738 would mandate. Applying federal preclusion principles, it
went on to hold that since plaintiffs could have raised the antitrust matter in their state
common law action, they could not assert their federal antitrust claim in federal court.
In its view, it was immaterial, for preclusion purposes, that a federal antitrust claim could
not be heard by a state court. Because of the similarity between the state antitrust claim
they could have raised and the federal antitrust claim they sought to raise in the subse-
quent federal action, claim preclusion applied even though federal courts have exclusive
jurisdiction over federal antitrust claims.
The Supreme Court held that the Seventh Circuit erred in failing to apply § 1738.
Even if the claim sought to be precluded is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the federal
courts, the federal court must still look first to state preclusion principles to determine the
claim preclusive effect of the prior state judgment. If state law would bar the subsequent
claim, then, and only then, should the federal court determine whether, as an exception
to § 1738, it should refuse to give preclusive effect to the state court judgment. Since the
Seventh Circuit had ignored the mandate of § 1738, the Court remanded the case for a
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claim preclusion as well as issue preclusion in Title VII actions. 8
Another source of confusion concerned the level of judicial re-
view that had been exercised by the state reviewing court in
Kremer. In response to Justice Blackmun's criticism, the majority
took the position that the state court had reviewed the merits of the
discrimination claim." This statement might lead one to interpret
Kremer as requiring more than an appellate standard of review for
state judgments to have preclusive effect in Title VII actions.8 0 It is
clear, however, that under New York law there is a deferential re-
view of administrative determinations. As long as the agency deci-
sion is supported by substantial weight of the evidence (after full
adjudication before the agency) or was not arbitrary, capricious or
an abuse of discretion (after a probable cause hearing),81 the deci-
sion should be affirmed. Since the Kremer decision, it has been
generally assumed, and correctly so, that a deferential standard of
review is sufficient for purposes of section 1738.2
Resolution of these ambiguities, however, only begins to address
the problems created by Kremer. There remains a need to develop
an analytical framework under which federal courts can apply the
Kremer rationale when faced with a preclusion defense in a Title
VII action.
IV. ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK FOR APPLYING KREMER
The main concern from a plaintiff's perspective is that Kremer
determination of what preclusive effect Illinois would give to its judgment. The Court
declined, at this juncture, to determine whether the grant of exclusive jurisdiction over
federal antitrust claims constituted an implied partial repeal of § 1738.
78. Cajigas v. Banco de Ponce, 741 F.2d 464 (1st Cir. 1984); Hickman v. Electronic
Keyboarding, Inc., 741 F.2d 230 (8th Cir. 1984); Kutzik v. Young, 730 F.2d 149 (4th
Cir. 1984); Burney v. Polk Community College, 728 F.2d 1374 (11 th Cir. 1984).
79. Kremer, 456 U.S. at 492.
80. Davis v. United States Steel Supply, 688 F.2d 166 (3d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 460
U.S. 1014 (1983) (suggesting that preclusion would not apply if the scope of review is
limited); see also Consolidated Foods Corp. v. Unger, 456 U.S. 1002 (Blackmun, J., con-
curring); Note, Kremer v. Chemical Construction Corp.: Federal-State Comity in Em-
ployment Discrimination, 15 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 121, 148 (1983) (if a deferential standard
of review is sufficient, complainants will be inclined to abandon state proceedings before
they reach the review stage).
81. N.Y. EXEC. LAW §§ 297-299 (McKinney 1982).
82. See, e.g., Unger v. Consolidated Food Corp., 693 F.2d 703 (7th Cir. 1982); C.
WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 9, § 4471, at 109 (Supp. 1984).
In fact, it is unclear why the Kremer majority thought it was even necessary to show
that the state court independently reviewed the merits of the claim. Arguably, § 1738
forecloses any inquiry into the nature of the state court judgment if the state would give
preclusive effect to the judgment and due process has been satisfied. Unger, 693 F.2d at
706 n.7.
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will deprive him of a full judicial determination of his Title VII
rights and thereby eviscerate the statute's effectiveness. From the
defendant's perspective, however, there clearly was a need to ra-
tionalize multiple state and federal remedies so as to avoid duplica-
tion of effort, fragmentation of remedial relief, and potentially
conflicting obligations.8 3 Kremer may be viewed as an attempt to
accommodate the legitimate concerns of both sides.
The federal courts, though, must be sensitive in their application
of preclusion principles. This is necessary in order to minimize the
adverse impact on private complainants and to harmonize the
overlapping remedial schemes. With such sensitivity, the congres-
sional purpose of guaranteeing a federal threshold of protection
and a trial de novo of one's Title VII rights can be reconciled with
the comity concerns articulated in Kremer.
To illustrate the possible permutations of Kremer, let us assume
that in a Title VII action before a federal court, defendant makes a
summary judgment motion to dismiss the claim on the ground that
a prior state determination precludes plaintiff from maintaining the
action. 4 How should the federal court give effect to Kremer?
83. This is not to suggest that the benefits of preclusion or the Kremer decision itself
are all one-sided. A prevailing state complainant can rely on preclusion when he seeks
additional relief under Title VII in cases where the relief available under the state's fair
employment statute is more limited than under Title VII. See New York Gaslight Club,
Inc. v. Carey, 447 U.S. 54 (1980). Similarly, favorable determinations of fact may be
binding on the defendant employer when the complainant commences a subsequent ac-
tion asserting theories of liability that could not have been asserted in the prior state
proceeding. For example, a complainant might file a state charge with his state FEP
agency; after prevailing there, he may commence a state court action to assert common
law claims that may afford him more comprehensive relief than the state statutory
scheme provides. Since the common law claims could not have been asserted before the
FEP agency, he is not precluded from commencing a second action. Furthermore, while
the second forum will resolve the legal issue of liability under state common law as well
as any additional factual disputes not decided in the first suit, findings of fact essential to
the first judgments may be binding in the second proceeding.
Notwithstanding the potential benefits for successful state complainants, the Kremer
decision has generally been invoked by defendants to preclude a complainant from assert-
ing Title VII rights in federal court subsequent to an unfavorable decision in a state
forum on complainant's state claim. This pattern is understandable inasmuch as many
state FEP statutes are broader than Title VII in terms of the classes they protect and the
relief they afford. Accordingly, a complainant who prevails on his state FEP claim will
seldom commence a subsequent Title VII action. Thus, this article focuses on the typical
scenario of an employee commencing a Title VII action after he has lost on his state
claim.
84. Since a ruling on a preclusion defense will often involve matters beyond the scope
of the pleadings, a Rule 56 motion for summary judgment is a commonly used procedural
device to determine the preclusion defense. If the matters necessary to establish preclu-
sion appear on the face of the complaint the defendant can make a Rule 12(b)(6) motion
to dismiss for failure to state a claim. See Jones v. Local 520, IUOE, 34 Fair Empl. Prac.
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A. Is the Prior State Determination a Judicial One?
When confronted with a motion to dismiss on the ground of pre-
clusion, the initial question for a federal court is whether the prior
state determination was an administrative or judicial determina-
tion. As Kremer indicated, unreviewed state administrative deter-
minations, even those made upon a full hearing with a full panoply
of procedural safeguards, are not entitled to full faith and credit
with respect to a Title VII claim.85 Thus, if the prior determina-
tion is an administrative one, the summary judgment motion
should be rejected. 6
Cas. (BNA) 634 (S.D. Ill. 1981). For a discussion of the procedural methods available in
federal court to raise the preclusion defense see A. VESTAL, supra note 71, at ch. 17.
85. Kremer, 456 U.S. at 470 n.7. Accord Jones v. Progress Lighting Corp., 36 Fair
Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 25 (E.D. Pa. 1984); Weise v. Syracuse Univ., 553 F. Supp. 675
(N.D.N.Y. 1982); Snow v. Nevada Dep't of Prisons, 543 F. Supp. 752 (D. Nev. 1982); cf
Gear v. City of Des Moines, 514 F. Supp. 1218 (S.D. Iowa 1981). Contra O'Hara v.
Board of Educ., 36 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 34,942 (D.N.J. June 27, 1984); Buckhalter
v. Pepsi-Cola Gen. Bottlers, 35 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 881 (N.D. Ill. 1984).
The Supreme Court has held that where an administrative agency acts in a judicial
capacity, its decision may have preclusive effect. United States v. Utah Constr. & Mining
Co., 384 U.S. 394, 422 (1966). Yet, in view of Title VII's procedural scheme in which the
EEOC determinations are not accorded preclusive effect, the Kremer Court reasoned that
Congress did not intend unreviewed state administrative decisions to have preclusive ef-
fect on Title VII claims. Kremer, 456 U.S. at 470 n.7. Notwithstanding the clear lan-
guage in Kremer, the courts in Buckhalter and O'Hara held that an unreviewed state
administrative determination has preclusive effect in Title VII actions. Specifically, the
Buckhalter court, relying on Utah Construction, held that since the Illinois FEP agency
acted in a judicial capacity, the Kremer dictum did not apply; in its view, to apply the
Kremer dictum to agencies acting in a judicial capacity would contradict the general
precedent established in Utah Construction that determination of agencies acting in a
judicial capacity come under the mandate of § 1738. Thus, the Buckhalter court consid-
ered footnote 7 to apply only to state agencies acting in a purely administrative capacity.
Yet, the Supreme Court in Kremer recognized that the specific procedural scheme of
Title VII reflects congressional intent to modify what would otherwise be the mandate of
§ 1738 to accord unreviewed administrative decisions the same preclusive effect as the
rendering state would. In other words, Title VII litigation does represent an exception to
the general rule enunciated in Utah Construction. Moreover, since the New York state
agency involved in the Kremer litigation does act in a judicial capacity, it is unlikely that
the Kremer Court intended to limit its language to state agencies acting in a non-judicial
capacity.
86. The Supreme Court has not resolved whether unreviewed administrative determi-
nations have preclusive effect with respect to employment discrimination claims brought
under other federal statutes. Compare Moore v. Bonner, 695 F.2d 799 (4th Cir. 1982)
(unreviewed administrative decision made in judicial capacity does not preclude claim
brought under § 1981) with Loudermill v. Cleveland Bd. of Educ., 721 F.2d 550 (6th Cir.
1983), afl'd on other grounds, 53 U.S.L.W. 4306 (U.S. Mar. 19, 1985) and Gear v. City of
Des Moines, 514 F. Supp. 1218 (S.D. Iowa 1981) (§ 1983 claim not barred, but adminis-
trative determination bars relitigation of facts).
The courts that deny preclusive effect to unreviewed administrative decisions in feder-
ally-based employment cases othcr than Title VII reason that plaintiffs should not be
forced to choose between foregoing the opportunity to resolve their claims before a state
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B. Is The Prior Judgment a Qualifying Judicial Determination
For the Purpose of Preclusion?
Assuming that the prior determination was judicial, the Kremer
rationale is operative. Since the directive of section 1738 is that
federal courts must first determine whether the courts of the state
rendering the judgment would deem the prior judgment to pre-
clude litigation of the discrimination matters arising under Title
VII, the federal court must apply state law preclusion prinicples.87
These principles can be divided into several components. With re-
spect to both issue and claim preclusion, it is generally required
that the prior judgment be a (1) final one, (2) on the merits, and
(3) the party to be precluded from litigating the matter was a party
to the prior suit or in privity with such a party. Further, with
respect to issue preclusion, the issue sought to be precluded must
be identical to the one litigated and necessarily decided in the prior
litigation; with respect to claim preclusion, on the other hand,
there must be an identity of claims.
In addition to analyzing each of these elements as the state of
rendition would, the federal court is to incorporate any limitations
the state court would consider, for under the directive of section
1738, the entire body of law the rendering state has developed with
respect to preclusion applies. 8 Thus, even though these elements
administrative agency and relinquishing congressionally mandated access to a federal fo-
rum. Moore v. Bonner, 695 F.2d 799 (4th Cir. 1982). Moreover, a complainant's § 1981
or § 1983 claim is often joined with a Title VII claim. Since complainant will be able to
proceed on his related Title VII claim notwithstanding the administrative adjudication, to
give administrative determinations preclusive effect with respect to § 1981 or § 1983
claims would not achieve the goals of finality and repose preclusion is designed to
achieve.
87. It has been suggested that Haring v. Prosise, 103 S. Ct. 2368 (1983), represents a
modification of the full faith and credit principles enunciated in Kremer. In Haring, the
Court held that a guilty plea in state court did not preclude the party from subsequently
raising a § 1983 claim in federal court that evidence had been seized in violation of his
fourth amendment rights. In the unanimous opinion, the Court stated that § 1738 "gen-
erally requires" federal courts to give the same preclusive effect the rendering state
would. Id. at 2373. It further stated that issue preclusion should not be given where
there was no full or fair opportunity to litigate the matter or when "special circumstances
warrant an exception to the normal rules of preclusion." Id. at n.7 (citing Montana v.
United States, 440 U.S. 147, 155 (1979)). Even if this language is interpreted as a retreat
from Kremer, the Haring Court agreed that the threshold question was whether the ren-
dering state's preclusion rules would bar litigation of the issue. Id. at 153. See generally
C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 9, at § 4471 (Supp. 1984) (minimizing the import
of the Court's language in footnote 7).
88. See Warren v. McCall, 709 F.2d 1183 (7th Cir. 1983); Concordia v. Benedkovi,
693 F.2d 1073 (1 1th Cir. 1982); Davis v. United States Steel Supply, 688 F.2d 166, 182
(3d Cir. 1982) (Garth, J. concurring), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1014 (1983).
Moreover, preclusion is an affirmative defense which the defendant must establish.
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are satisfied, many states will not apply issue preclusion if it was
not foreseeable that the issue would arise in the context of a subse-
quent action, or the party did not have the incentive or opportunity
to litigate the issue fully in the prior proceeding, or the burden of
persuasion has shifted or is different in the second proceeding.
With respect to claim preclusion, a state may also recognize the
party's right to split his claim if the court or agency hearing the
first proceeding did not have the subject matter jurisdiction to
render complete relief. Or, the state may recognize the right of
parties to agree to permit plaintiff to split his claim. 9 This article
will explore some of these exceptions in specific contexts, but suf-
fice it to say, here, that the federal courts must be alert to all the
state exceptions whenever faced with a preclusion defense.
1. Was the Prior State Judgment a Judgment "On the Merits?"
To preclude complainant's Title VII action, the prior state judg-
ment must be a final judgment' "on the merits." Thus, when a
state court dismisses a complaint on jurisdictional grounds, such a
judgment is generally not treated as being on the merits by the
state,9' and therefore, the federal court should not give it binding
Davis v. United States Steel Supply, 688 F.2d 166 (3d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S.
1014 (1983).
89. See generally A. VESTAL, supra note 71, at ch. 13; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
JUDGMENTS §§ 26, 28-29 (1982). Whatever these limitations may be, under the mandate
of § 1738, the federal court must apply them as the state court would. The only federally
fashioned limitation is that minimum due process be satisfied. Allen v. McCurry, 449
U.S. 90, 113 (1980) (Blackmun, J., dissenting). But see Haring v. Prosise, 462 U.S. 306,
311 n.7 (1983) ("special circumstances warrant an exception to the normal rules of
preclusion").
90. Whether the prior state judgment is "final" for purposes of preclusion has not
been a critical question in those reported cases where preclusion is raised as a defense in a
Title VII action. It has been stated that a judgment is final with respect to a claim "if it is
not tentative, provisional, or contingent and represents the completion of all steps in the
adjudication of the claim by the court, short of any steps by way of execution or enforce-
ment .... ." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 13 comment b (1982). Also,
as long as an appeal does not have the effect of vacating the judgment of the trial court, a
judgment otherwise final remains so despite the taking of an appeal; the pendency of an
appeal, however, may suspend the second court resolving the preclusion issue. Id. at
comment f. See generally A. VESTAL, supra note 71, at 233-38. With respect to issue
preclusion, it has been suggested that if the issue was adequately deliberated and firm, it is
not necessary that a final judgment be entered. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDG-
MENTS § 13 comment g (1982). For a discussion of finality, see Note, The Finality of
Judgments in the Conflict of Laws, 41 COLUM. L. REV. 878 (1941).
91. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 20 (1982). When a judgment dis-
missing a complaint is not on the merits, it is conclusive only as to what was actually
decided. Thus, if a complaint is dismissed for failure to join an indispensable party, the
complainant's claim is not barred, but the determination that a particular person is an
indispensable party is binding on complainant.
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effect in a subsequent itle VII action.92 On the other hand, when
the state court resolves the substantive issues of a case, the judg-
ment is clearly on the merits.93
Under generally stated principles of preclusion, however, a court
need not consider the substantive issues for the judgment to be "on
the merits." For example, the charging party may have had his
state discrimination claim dismissed for failure to file on a timely
basis. Or a complainant may have commenced his state proceed-
ing on a timely basis, but the complaint was dismissed for failure to
prosecute or refusal to comply with court directives or rules.
Although such dismissals are procedurally based, in contrast to
substantive or jurisdictional dismissals, state law may view them as
"on the merits" for preclusion purposes. 94 Accordingly, the plain-
tiff cannot reassert in a subsequent state action the same theory of
liability or other theories he could have raised in the first proceed-
ing.95 In light of Kremer, may the complainant proceed in the fed-
eral system on his Title VII claim, even though he would be barred
from raising the same state discrimination matters in state
proceedings?
Kremer has been interpreted to constitute a bar in such a situa-
tion.96 The Kremer decision itself, however, rests on the assump-
tion that Congress intended every charging party to be heard at
least once on his discrimination claim.97 Since Kremer had his op-
portunity on the state level, he could not have a second bite of the
apple. Indeed, the majority went to pains to emphasize that the
New York court had reviewed the "merits" of Kremer's case. Of
92. Loudermill v. Cleveland Bd. of Educ., 721 F.2d 550 (6th Cir. 1983) (since failure
to perfect timely appeal is considered jurisdictional under state law, state judgment does
not bar federally-based discrimination charge); see also Superior Oil Co. v. City of Port
Arthur, 553 F. Supp. 511 (E.D. Tex. 1982).
93. The state court need not have a full trial on the merits of the claim however. A
judgment entered on (1) defendant's default; (2) upon a motion for summary judgment or
failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted; or (3) on consent of the parties
is considered on the merits under common law principles of preclusion. lB MOORE,
FEDERAL PRACTICE § 409 (1984). In addition, a state may treat an administrative de-
termination affirmed by a reviewing court as on the merits though the court did not
resolve the disputed substantive issues de novo; and, as Kremer illustrates, if the state
treats the judgment as on the merits so must the federal courts.
94. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 19 comments e, f (1982); Kahn v.
Kahn, 68 Cal. App. 3d 372, 137 Cal. Rptr. 332 (1977) (failure to comply with discovery
order).
95. See supra notes 71-73 and accompanying text.
96. See Loudermill v. Cleveland Bd. of Educ., 721 F.2d 550, 558 (6th Cir. 1983),
aff'd, 53 U.S.L.W. 4306 (U.S. Mar. 19, 1985); Santos v. Todd Pacific Shipyards, 35 Fair
Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 681, 683-84 (C.D. Cal. 1984).
97. Kremer, 456 U.S. at 477.
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course, it is clear that under New York law the Kremer state court
did not make de novo determinations of the merits of the claim.
Nevertheless, to the extent that a reviewing court finds a substan-
tial basis for the agency's decision, an affirmance based on a defer-
ential standard of review may be a decision on the merits of the
claim in a substantive sense. Accordingly, it would not contravene
Congress's intent to provide a judicial forum for Title VII matters
where there has been a prior state determination of the substantive
discrimination issues. Yet, in view of the Kremer Court's emphasis
on the state reviewing the "merits" of the case, it is doubtful that
the Court will give preclusive effect if the state judgment is com-
pletely unrelated to the substance of the case.9" To do so would
deprive the complainant of his procedural right to have the merits
of his Title VII claim determined by some judicial forum. More-
over, Congress intended that Title VII serve as a national threshold
of protection. Consistent with this congressional purpose, where
there has been no state court determination of the substantive
grounds of the charge, preclusion should not apply.
Aside from the thrust of the Kremer opinion, it is doubtful that
section 1738 requires that a procedurally-based dismissal of one's
state fair employment claim preclude litigation of one's Title VII
rights in federal court.99 It is true that a judgment dismissing a
claim on the basis of the state's statute of limitations will generally
have preclusive effect within the state. In the context of the inter-
state system, however, if the state statute of limitations is one that
bars only the remedy, the dismissal establishes only that the action
cannot be brought in the same jurisdiction in which the statute is
applicable. Notwithstanding the obligation of each state to accord
full faith and credit to a sister state's judgment, the claim may be
98. See Griffin v. George B. Buck Consulting Actuaries, 551 F. Supp. 1385, 1386 n.6
(S.D.N.Y. 1982) (Kremer does not apply where there has been no state judicial review on
the merits of the state agency's determination, but only an afirmance based on a proce-
dural deficiency); Gargiul v. Tompkins, 704 F.2d 661 (2d Cir. 1983) (where reviewing
court does not review legal arguments of complainant but dismisses for procedural rea-
sons, § 1738 is not operative); Truvillion v. King's Daughters Hosp., 614 F.2d 520 (5th
Cir. 1980) (dismissal of EEOC suit for failure to meet procedural prerequisite no bar to
private action).
99. This assumes that the Title VII theory could not have been raised in the prior
state proceeding. If it could, principles of claim preclusion would be operative. See infra
notes 146-53 and accompanying text. Thus, the Title VII claim would be barred not
because an identical state law claim had been dismissed but because the state proceeding
could have heard the timely Title VII claim. For a discussion on whether state courts
have concurrent jurisdiction over Title VII claims, see infra notes 173-203 and accompa-
nying text.
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raised in another state. 0e Similarly, the federal courts should not
give such dismissals preclusive effect in a Title VII action even
though dismissal of the state claim is deemed a final judgment on
the merits within the state.' 0'
Moreover, even if the state's time period operates as a limitation
of the right, a dismissal of the state fair employment practice claim
for failure to file on a timely basis should not foreclose a compara-
ble Title VII claim in a subsequent suit. Clearly, each state legisla-
ture, in creating rights to protect persons against emloyment
discrimination, may establish a time period which it thinks appro-
priate. Its choice of an extremely short time period may reflect a
concern for the adjudication of stale claims in its courts or a desire
to protect the prospective defendant class. No one can quarrel
with the state's right to do this and the obligation of other jurisdic-
tions to recognize such a time bar. Congress, however, in enacting
Title VII, decided what the appropriate time period for the asser-
tion of a federally created right would be.'0 2 This decision should
100. Where the time period only goes to the remedy, it is treated as a procedural
matter to be governed by the law of the forum state. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDG-
MENTS § 19 comment f (1982); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICTS § 110 (1971).
But see C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 9, at § 4441.
101. See Jimenez v. Calero Toledo, 576 F.2d 402 (1st Cir. 1978) (where state court
had only reached issue of time bar, plaintiff not precluded from bringing § 1983 claim in
federal court alleging unlawful dismissal); Chapman v. Aetna Finance Co., 615 F.2d 361
(5th Cir. 1980); Gavin v. Peoples Natural Gas Co., 464 F. Supp. 622, 625 (W.D. Pa.
1979), rev'd on other grounds, 613 F.2d 482 (3d Cir. 1980); Hollander v. Sears, Roebuck
& Co., 392 F. Supp. 90, 94-95 (D. Conn. 1975) (dismissals by reviewing court because of
untimely appeals not a judgment "on the merits"). But see Santos v. Todd Pacific Ship-
yards, 35 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 681 (C.D. Cal. 1984) (state court's affirmance of
state FEP agency's dismissal of untimely state discrimination charge bars otherwise
timely § 1983 claim arising from same operative facts); C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra
note 9, at § 4471.
Nilsen v. City of Moss Point, 701 F.2d 556 (5th Cir. 1983), is likewise not inconsistent
with the position taken in this article. There, the court held that a federal court's dismis-
sal of one's Title VII claim for failure to comply with the statute's filing requirements
bars a subsequent § 1983 claim for unalwful employment discrimination. Under the
terms of Rule 41 (b), the dismissal on statute of limitation grounds was one "on the mer-
its" and therefore all timely claims that could have been raised in the first forum were
precluded by the judgment. That a dismissal based on a statute of limitations should bar
complainant from asserting a related federal claim in federal court is consistent with the
view that such judgments are treated as "on the merits" within the system that !endered
it. See also PRC Harris, Inc. v. Boeing Co., 700 F.2d 894 (2d Cir. 1983). Moreover, in
Nilsen, the plaintiff could have raised the timely claim in the first action. That would not
be the case if the complainant brought his state claim to an FEP agency since the
agency's jurisdiction is limited to the state statutory claim. The complainant's only op-
portunity to assert his timely federal claim would be in a subsequent proceeding. There-
fore, dismissal of his state statutory claim for statute of limitations reasons, even if
afrmed on review, should not bar other timely claims.
102. In many cases the Title VII time period is shorter than that under comparable
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not be subverted by a state decision unrelated to Congress's con-
cerns in enacting Title VII. 1°3 If Congress had wanted federal
rights to be governed by state statutes of limitations it could have
deferred to the states on the matter; it chose not to. Accordingly,
even if the state time period goes to the right created, a dismissal of
a state claim for failure to file on a timely basis should not preclude
a timely Title VII action which otherwise comports with the proce-
dural prerequisites of Title VII.
A similar question arises in the context of penalty dismissals,
whereby a state-based discrimination charge may have been dis-
missed because plaintiff failed to prosecute the claim or comply
with discovery directives. Is such a dismissal, which is unrelated
to the substance of the charge, "on the merits" for purposes of
section 1738? Arguably, the federal court should support the at-
tempts of the state court to compel adherence to its rules and,
thereby, give full faith and credit to the state sanction.1" On the
other hand, such a result would deprive the complainant of any
determination on the substance of his charge and disregard the
Kremer premise that claimant is entitled to one adjudication of his
Title VII claim.1"5 Furthermore, effectiveness of the state court
sanction would not be materially undermined since the judgment
would have preclusive effect within the state system.
2. Is There an Identity of Parties?
Preclusion principles are clearly operative where the parties in
the first proceeding are the same as those in the second. But a
prior judgment may have binding effect not only on a party named
state fair employment statutes. See, e.g., N.Y. EXEc. L. § 297(5) (McKinney 1982) (one
year). In others it is longer. See, e.g., PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43 § 959(g) (Purdon's Supp.
1984) (90 days).
103. In Burnett v. Grattan, 104 S. Ct. 2924 (1984), which held that state FEP admin-
istrative time limitations are not applicable to claims brought under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981,
1983, 1985 (1982), the Supreme Court recognized the policy concerns that underlie a
state statute of limitations. These may include the state legislatures' view of the impor-
tance of the underlying claim, the need for repose and considerations of judicial or ad-
ministrative economy. In its view: "State legislatures do not devise their limitations
period with national interests in mind, and it is the duty of federal courts to assure that
the importation of state law will not frustrate or interfere with the implementation of
national policies." Id. at 2931 (quoting Occidental Life Ins. Co. v. EEOC, 432 U.S. 355,
367 (1977)).
104. Evans v. Syracuse, 704 F.2d 44 (2d Cir. 1983) (dismissal for failure to prosecute
state claims has preclusive effect in Title VII action).
105. Cf. Chapman v. Aetna Fin. Co., 615 F.2d 361 (5th Cir. 1980); Griffin v. George
B. Buck Consulting Actuaries, 551 F. Supp. 1385 (S.D.N.Y. 1983).
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in the prior action, but also on those in privity with him. 106 More-
over, in the specific area of issue preclusion, many states have re-
jected the requirement that there be mutuality of preclusion. 10 7
Thus, a stranger to the first proceeding, that is, one who was
neither a party nor in privity with a party in the earlier proceeding,
may invoke the prior judgment against one who was a party in the
first action or his privy. In essence, these states permit the stranger
to the first suit to rely on the prior judgment, although it has no
binding effect on him. 0 8  Other states have retained the rule of
mutuality.109
Problems of privity and mutuality will seldom arise in successive
106. See generally A. VESTAL, RES JUDICATA OF PRECLUSION 120-29, 291-300
(1969); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS §§ 39, 41, 43-61 (1982).
107. The rule of mutuality is based on the notion that since a person not a party to
the first action is not bound by the judgment, he should not be entitled to claim the
benefits of the prior adjudication. In other words, only those parties involved in the prior
proceeding and who therefore may be bound by the first judgment can invoke its preclu-
sive effect. Application of the mutuality rule may be illustrated as follows:
1. F, - A v. B Determination of an essential issue unfavorable to B.
2. F2 - A v. B A sues B on a different claim. Since A would be bound by
determinations made in F, unfavorable to him, A can invoke
preclusion against B.
But suppose the second action was as follows:
2. F2 - C v. B Since C was not a party or in privity with a party involved in
F,, under constitutional principles of due process, C would
not be bound by determinations made in F, favorable to B.
Accordingly, the rule of mutuality prevents C from invoking
the first judgment to bind B on the issues decided unfavorably
to him in F,.
For discussions on the mutuality rule see generally Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc. v.
University of I11. Found., 402 U.S. 313, 329 (1971); Bernard v. Bank of Am. Nat'l Trust
& Sav. Ass'n, 19 Cal.2d 807, 122 P.2d 892 (1942).
108. See e.g., Bernard v. Bank of Am. Nat'l Trust & Sav. Ass'n, 19 Cal. 807, 122 P.2d
892 (1942); Schwartz v. Pub. Adm'r, 24 N.Y.2d 65, 246 N.E.2d 725, 298 N.Y.S.2d 955
(1969); Bahler v. Fletcher, 257 Ore. 1, 474 P.2d 329 (1970).
Even in those jurisdictions that have accepted non-mutuality of preclusion, the courts
will consider various factors that might justify relitigation of the issue. These factors
include (1) whether the party had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue in the
first proceeding (Hicks v. De la Cruz, 52 Ohio St. 2d 71, 369 N.E.2d 776 (1977)); whether
procedural opportunities in the presentation of issues are greater in the second forum
than the first (Fred Olson Motor Serv. v. Container Corp., 81 Ill. App. 3d 825, 401
N.E.2d 1098 (1980)); and (3) whether the party invoking preclusion could have effected
joinder in the first proceeding (B.R. DeWitt, Inc. v. Hall, 19 N.Y.2d 141, 225 N.E.2d
195, 278 N.Y.S.2d 596 (1967)). Thus, even if the judgment raised in the subsequent
federal action is from a state that has adopted non-mutual preclusion, the federal court
must consider those factors the state court would in determining whether to permit
relitigation.
109. See, e.g., Standage Venture, Inc. v. State, 114 Ariz. 480, 562 P.2d 360 (1977);
Norfolk & Western Railway Co. v. Bailey's Lumber Co., 332 Va. 638, 272 S.E.2d 217
(1980).
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individual employment suits. Since filing with the EEOC is only
effective against those defendants also named in the state FEP
charge, the complainants and defendants in the federal Title VII
action will often be the same as those in the prior state proceeding.
Yet, in those limited number of cases in which it does arise, the
federal court will have to consider state law on privity and
mutuality.
a. Are the parties to the Title VII action in privity with the
parties to the prior state action?
"Privity" is an elusive concept which defies exact definition.' 10
It applies to those non-parties who derive their rights from the
party in the first action, or whose interests are so clearly related
that the law considers them in privity.1"' In addition, the non-
party's interest may have ben adequately represented by the named
party so that a court will treat the prior judgment as binding on
both. 1 2
In the context of Title VII litigation, the question of privity may
arise when the named plaintiff in the first proceeding is a union or
state FEP agency asserting the rights of an individual employee.
Hickman v. Electronic Keyboarding, Inc.,113 illustrates the context
in which the privity issue may arise. There, the state FEP agency
had brought an unsuccessful state claim on behalf of the charging
party. The employee subsequently brought a Title VII action. The
issue before the federal court was whether the individual employee
was foreclosed from maintaining a Title VII action because she was
in privity with the losing party to the first proceeding.
To determine whether preclusion with respect to the non-party
is appropriate, it is common under state law to ascertain the
amount of control the non-party had over the prior litigation; that
is, did he actually have the opportunity to protect his interest? In
addition, the court should examine factors that affected the named-
party's litigation posture: was it motivated to press the individual's
interests or did it have its own interests to serve? 14
110. See Bruszewski v. United States, 181 F.2d 419, 423 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 340
U.S. 865 (1950) ("Privity... is merely a word used to say that the relationship between
the one who is a party on the record and another is close enough to include that other
within resjudicata."). The RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS §§ 1, 13-14, 34-61
(1982), has rejected the generalized term "privity" in favor of specified relationships that
might lead to preclusion.
111. See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS §§ 43-61 (1982).
112. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS §§ 39, 41, 42 (1982).
113. 35 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1281 (8th Cir. 1984).
114. Because of institutional limitations or internal conflicts, an organization might
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For example, in her attempt to avoid preclusion, the plaintiff in
Hickman argued that institutional considerations, aside from the
merits of her individual claim, may have affected the litigation
strategy of the state agency. More specifically, she maintained that
financial limitations might induce the agency to favor some claims
over others. Although the court rejected the plaintiff's argument
in this instance," 5 the case illustrates the importance of analyzing
the degree of control the individual has over the course of the state
litigation, and the extent to which the interests of the non-party
were represented. 1 6 Only if these considerations are satisfied is it
appropriate to treat the employee as being in privity with the party
in the prior proceeding.
b. Does the rendering state adhere to mutuality of preclusion?
The federal court faced with a preclusion defense will only be
concerned with the mutuality rule of the rendering state when the
party invoking the prior state judgment was neither a party nor in
privity with a party involved in the prior state proceeding. The
mutuality question may arise in different contexts. For example,
assume that employee A obtains a judgment against his employer
under state law. May fellow-employee B, who was not a party in
the first suit nor represented by employee A, maintain in his own
Title VII action that certain factual and legal determinations essen-
tial to the first judgment are binding on the employer? 7 Con-
not press forcefully the rights of the individual it is representing. For example, in Mc-
Donald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273, 284-85 (1976), the union admitted
that in representing a group of employees who had been discharged for joint misconduct,
it might have to compromise the rights of some individuals to secure the retention of
others.
115. In the court's view, the agency was acting for the employee's benefit and the
relationship between the two was close enough to treat the two as being in privity.
116. See also Jones v. Bell Helicopter Co., 614 F.2d 1389 (5th Cir. 1980) (individual
foreclosed from private lawsuit where court had dismissed previous EEOC action
brought on private claimant's behalf); Telephone Workers v. New Jersey Bell Tel. Co., 18
Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 298 (3d Cir. 1978) (finding that male employees were
under-represented in a clerical position in action brought by union, binding on female
clerical employee in her subsequent suit alleging employment discrimination where mem-
bers had been sufficiently represented by the union in the prior action).
117. Since employee B was not a party to the first suit, he would not be bound by an
adverse judgment against a fellow employee because, in general, co-workers are not in
privity. Grann v. City of Madison, 35 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 296 (7th Cir. 1984)
(company employees are not privies under state law since they neither derive their rights
to be free from discrimination from each other; nor, in this case, were the employees in
the second suit in control or represented in the prior litigation). Accord Local 1006 v.
Wurf, 558 F. Supp. 230, 235-36 (N.D. Ill. 1982). However, even though the second em-
ployee is not bound by the prior judgment, he can invoke the judgment against a party to
the first action if the mutuality rule is inapplicable.
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versely, assume that one complainant has asserted claims in
successive employment suits against different companies involving
identical legal or factual issues. Clearly, separate claims are in-
volved and a prior determination against one company is not bind-
ing against an unrelated company that was not involved in the first
suit. Nevertheless, may the second company invoke adverse fac-
tual or legal findings against the complainant in his Title VII ac-
tion where the complainant had a full and fair opportunity to
litigate the issue in a prior proceeding?
In both these examples, the federal court should consider state
law on mutuality. If the state rendering the prior judgment re-
quires that the party invoking issue preclusion in a subsequent ac-
tion have been a party or in privity with a party in the prior
proceeding, preclusion should not apply.1 8 If the rendering state,
however, has rejected the rule of mutuality and only requires that
the party against whom issue preclusion is invoked have been a
party or in privity with a party in the prior suit, then the federal
court should apply that rule." 9
3. Is There an Identity of Issues or Claims?
When defendant seeks dismissal of the Title VII action on the
118. An example of employees suing the same employer in separate suits is illustrated
in Hellings v. Delta Airlines, 15 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 955 (S.D. Ohio 1976). In
the first employee's action, the company's employment policy of grounding stewardesses
in their fifth month of pregnancy was considered unlawful. In an action brought by
another employee, the company was precluded from relitigating the policy's lawfulness
under Title VII. The application of issue preclusion in this context is an example of
offensive non-mutual preclusion; that is, a stranger to the first litigation precludes the
defendant from relitigating an issue he lost in an earlier proceeding. See also EEOC v.
Pacific Press Pub. Ass'n, 34 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1165 (N.D. Cal. 1981).
An example of defensive non-mutual preclusion is illustrated by the employee who
brings successive actions against unrelated companies. In Stebbins v. Nationwide Mutual
Ins. Co., 3 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1217 (E.D. Va. 1971), aff'd on other grounds,
469 F.2d 268 (4th Cir. 1972), an individual sued an insurance company for denying him a
position as a claims adjuster. It was determined that he was unqualified to serve as an
adjuster. In a subsequent action against another insurance company, the individual was
precluded from relitigating the factual issue of his qualifications. This use of preclusion is
defensive in that it is used by defendant to preclude plaintiff from relitigating an issue he
litigated and lost in a prior proceeding.
The question of non-mutual preclusion may also arise in the context of determinations
made by non-FEP agencies, such as unemployment compensation boards. There, the
board might deny benefits on the ground that the employee was justly dismissed. If the
employee maintains that his discharge was the result of a discriminatory practice and the
allegation is ultimately rejected, may the employer, who was a stranger to the first action,
rely on the judgment for preclusion purposes? See supra notes 132-42 and accompanying
text.
119. But see supra note 44.
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basis of a prior state judgment, the federal court must also deter-
mine whether the rendering state would find an identity of issues or
claims to warrant preclusion. This task involves a comparison of
federal and state law to determine whether the protection available
under Title VII, including the standard of liability, burdens of per-
suasion and relief available, is narrower than or identical to the
protection afforded under state law.
To the extent that identical issues were actually decided and es-
sential to the state judgment, prinicples of issue preclusion will ap-
ply. 120 To the extent that rights identical to those under Title VII
could have been asserted in the state proceeding, but were not,
claim preclusion applies.' 2' Preclusion should not apply with re-
spect to those Title VII matters that are broader than the rights
under state law and which could not have been raised in the state
proceeding.'22 Thus, the federal court judge, in implementing
Kremer, must scrutinize carefully the rights afforded under state
and federal law respectively, and what the prior state proceeding
actually decided or could have decided.
a. Identity of factual and legal issues
The Supreme Court in Kremer considered the federal and state
legal issues raised by the plaintiff in his successive suits to be identi-
cal, thereby making issue preclusion appropriate. 23 The applica-
tion of isue preclusion is not always so clear-cut. Although it may
appear that the same discrimination charge was at issue in the state
proceeding, different standards of liability may be involved. The
crucial question is not whether there was a prior finding of no un-
lawful discrimination, but whether the state forum applied antidis-
crimination principles identical with those mandated by Title
120. Kremer, 456 U.S. 461; Unger v. Consolidated Foods Corp., 693 F.2d 703 (7th
Cir. 1982) (state statute was at least as broad as Title VII thereby justifying issue preclu-
sion). Where the rights under Title VII are narrower, a rejection of the state claim would
logically foreclose litigation of complainant's Title VII claim.
121. Kremer, 456 U.S. at 465 n.4.
Claim preclusion will also apply if the complainant could have asserted in the state
proceeding federal rights that are as broad as the rights arising under Title VII.
122. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 26(1)(c) (1982). Whether those
matters peculiar to Title VII could have been raised in the first proceeding depends on the
authority of the state's adjudicatory body to hear Title VII claims. See infra notes 146-
53, 173-203 and accompanying text.
123. The Supreme Court observed that "the alleged discriminatory acts are prohib-
ited by both federal and state laws," and that "[t]he elements of a successful employment
discrimination claim are virtually identical (under the two statutes)." Kremer, 456 U.S.
at 479.
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For example, under federal law, unlawful discrimination may be
found where a facially neutral employment policy has a disparate
impact on a protected class, without regard to whether there is any
intent to discriminate. Accordingly, if state law does not provide
for a disparate impact theory, a finding of no discrimination should
not be binding on the issue of legality under Title VII. 125
Similarly, the state might have a narrower definition of unlawful
discrimination. For example, in Reynolds v. New York State De-
partment of Correctional Services, 126 the claimant failed to prevail
under New York's fair employment statute in state proceedings be-
cause the employer's conduct rested on a bona fide occupational
qualification ("BFOQ"). He subsequently brought a Title VII
claim in federal court. Notwithstanding the procedural similarity
with Kremer, the federal court held that preclusion did not apply.
It reasoned that the claimant's state claim of unlawful discrimina-
tion was rejected on the basis of a state BFOQ defense that was
broader than that under Title VII. Thus, the claimant might be
entitled to relief under Title VII even though the state system re-
jected his apparently similar charge under state law.1 27 Accord-
ingly, whether the employer had acted lawfully under a BFOQ
defense would be decided de novo under federal law.
On occasion, however, a federal court has merely assumed that
the legal issue of employment discrimination is the same under
state and federal law. In Davis v. United States Steel Supply,1 28
complainant had brought a claim under a local discrimination or-
dinance for, in part, termination of her employment on the basis of
124. Id. at 479 n.4; cf Brown v. Felsen, 442 U.S. 127 (1979) (if, in the course of
adjudicating a state law question, a state court should determine factual issues using stan-
dards identical to those of § 17 [of the federal Bankruptcy Act], then collateral estoppel,
in the absence of countervailing statutory policy, would bar relitigation of those issues in
the bankruptcy court.); Unger v. Consolidated Foods Corp., 693 F.2d 703 (7th Cir. 1982)
(state statute prohibiting unlawful discrimination as broad as Title VII thereby justifying
issue preclusion).
125. For example, it is questionable whether disparate impact theory is recognized
under Nebraska's FEP statute. See Physicians Mut. Ins. Co. v. Duffy, 191 Neb. 223, 214
N.W.2d 471 (1974); Willbom, Employment Discrimination Laws in Nebraska: A Proce-
dural Labyrinth, 62 NEB. L. REV. 708, 728 (1983). Accordingly, a legal finding of no
discrimination under Nebraska law should not be binding with respect to a federal claim
pursuant to principles of issue preclusion.
126. 568 F. Supp. 747 (S.D.N.Y. 1983).
127. Even though issue preclusion does not apply, if the state proceeding had the
authority to hear Title VII matters, claim preclusion may. See infra notes 146-53, 173-
203 and accompanying text.
128. 688 F.2d 166 (3d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1014 (1983).
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race. The local agency, which had jurisdiction to hear only claims
arising under the city's civil rights ordinance, found that United
States Steel Supply (USSS) had discriminated unlawfully. Its legal
determination was based on several findings of fact. On USSS's
appeal, the state court concluded that the agency's determination
was supported by substantial evidence. On further appeal to the
intermediate state court, the agency's determination of racial dis-
crimination was reversed.' 29 The reversal was not based on the lack
of substantial evidence to support the agency's findings of fact.
Rather, the reviewing court concluded that the findings of fact did
not support the legal conclusion that the ordinance had been
violated.
The complainant subsequently brought a federal employment
claim under section 1981.130 The Third Circuit, relying on
Kremer, indicated that issue as well as claim preclusion would be
applicable to bar the complainant from litigating her employment
discrimination claim under section 1981. In its view, the state
court had found that there was insufficient evidence to establish
that Ms. Davis had been discriminated against on the basis of race.
The court did not think it relevant that the local agency's jurisdic-
tion was limited to claims arising under the local ordinance; nor
did it determine whether the local standard of liability was identi-
cal to that under federal law. But clearly, the state court judgment
could not have been based on whether the agency's findings of fact
constituted unlawful discrimination under section 1981 since the
agency had no jurisdiction over a section 1981 claim.13 1 That issue
of law under section 1981 had not been determined, either by the
agency or the reviewing court. Therefore, without a determination
that liability under the city and federal standard was identical, is-
sue preclusion should not bar litigation of whether the employer
engaged in discriminatory practices under federal law. Similarly, a
Title VII claim should not be barred unless the standard of liability
under state law is identical to that under Title VII.
The problem of ascertaining whether there has been a prior de-
termination of the same issue also arises with respect to non-FEP
agencies, such as unemployment compensation boards and person-
nel panels. In determining whether a person has been properly dis-
charged, such agencies may hear and determine allegations of
129. Id. at 169. Members of the Third Circuit disagreed whether the state court
reversal rejected only complainant's specific claim of racially motivated discharge or the
broader charges of racial discrimination as well. Id. at 182 (Gibbons, J., dissenting).
130. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1982).
131. Davis, 688 F.2d at 187 (Gibbons, J., dissenting).
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discriminatory practices. Of course, the agency decision affirmed
by the state court in Kremer was that of an agency primarily re-
sponsible for the enforcement of the state's fair employment stat-
ute. Therefore, one might argue that agencies that do not have the
same expertise or mandate as state FEP agencies should not affect
one's Title VII rights. Yet, it appears that the mandate of section
1738 applies to judicial affirmance of non-FEP agencies as well.132
The first question, then, is whether the state would give preclusive
effect to judicial affirmances of determinations by state agencies not
primarily responsible for the enforcement of the state's fair em-
ployment practices statute.1 33 If it would not, the employee can
relitigate those issues in his Title VII action. If the state would
accord such determinations preclusive effect with respect to dis-
crimination issues arising under state law, the federal court is obli-
gated to give the findings preclusive effect with respect to identical
Title VII issues.
One, however, must not lose sight of the fact that only identical
issues are precluded. In this regard, a finding of just cause for dis-
missal should not necessarily preclude a subsequent Title VII
charge of discriminatory practices. In Knox v. Cornell Univer-
sity,1 34 for example, a black employee was fired allegedly for his
failure to adhere to university regulations concerning time off.
When he applied for unemployment benefits, a hearing was held by
the employment compensation board to determine whether he had
been discharged because of his own misconduct. The hearing of-
ficer's determination, which was affirmed on review, concluded
that complainant had "lost his employment as a direct result of his
own misconduct in failing to adhere to the employer's regulations
concerning time off." Apparently, the complainant did not specifi-
cally allege that he had been the victim of a discriminatory dis-
132. In Kremer it was the state court judgment and not the particular expertise or
subject matter jurisdiction of the administrative agency that determined the federal
court's full faith and credit obligation. Burney v. Polk Community College, 34 Fair
Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 727 (11 th Cir. 1984); Ross v. Comsat, 34 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas.
(BNA) 260 (D. Md. 1984) (rejecting argument that Kremer is limited to court review of
FEP agencies).
133. See Umberfield v. School Dist. No. 11, 522 P.2d 730 (Colo. 1974) (teacher ten-
ure board determinations have preclusive effect though state had established specialized
agency to hear employment discrimination claims); Hinfey v. Matawan Regional Bd. of
Educ., 77 N.J. 514 (1978) (Department of Education has concurrent jurisdiction with
Division on Civil Rights with respect to unlawful discrimination in the public schools).
But see Comment, Application of Res Judicata, 52 DEN. L.J. 595 (1975) (that non-FEP
agency determinations should not have preclusive effect with respect to state employment
discrimination claims).
134. 30 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 433 (N.D.N.Y. 1982).
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charge under the state's fair employment practices statute.
Nevertheless, the federal court dismissed his subsequent Title VII
action on the ground that the just cause determination barred him
under state principles of issue preclusion from litigating whether
the discharge was unlawful under Title VII.
135
In these cases, as with those in which a state FEP agency rejects
a state FEP claim, one should inquire (1) whether the issue of un-
lawful discrimination was actually litigated and necessarily de-
cided, and (2) if it was, whether the agency used the same standard
of liability that a federal court judge would use in a Title VII ac-
tion. Contrary to the court's holding, the issue of just cause re-
solved by the Knox state court under the state's unemployment law
was not the same legal issue as whether the discharge was the re-
sult of an unlawful discriminatory policy. The employee may very
well have engaged in some type of misconduct that would justify in
dismissal. Yet if the employer applied different standards with re-
spect to its black employees, the employer's action would be clearly
in violation of Title VII. 136 In fact, Knox alleged in his Title VII
complaint that blacks were held to a stricter standard of perform-
ance than whites. Since that issue of disparate treatment was never
decided by the state agency, principles of issue preclusion should
not have barred him from litigating that question. 137 Because pre-
clusion was applied, Knox was improperly deprived of the substan-
tive rights Title VII accords him.
Moreover, even assuming that the discharged employee had
135. Id. at 435-36.
136. In McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273 (1976), black and
white employees had misappropriated property; yet, the black employees were main-
tained and certain white employees were fired. Although the employees' misconduct was
a legitimate basis for the termination of their employment, the Court held that the firing
may be a violation of Title VII if the employment policy is not applied equally.
137. The court in Rawson v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 554 F. Supp. 327 (D. Colo.
1983), recognized the important distinction between the issue of just cause for dismissal
and that of discriminatory practices. There, the agency found that the employee had
been dismissed for questionable job performance and failure to properly administer em-
ployer procedures. The state court, which was limited to reviewing the record below,
affirmed. The court held that since neither state proceeding court had heard or decided
the issue of age discrimination, the employee was not collaterally estopped from raising
the issue in a subsequent federal action. Simply stated, the issue of age discrimination
had not been actually litigated or decided. But see Harding v. Ramsay, Scarlett & Co., 36
Fed. Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 717 (D. Md. Nov. 30, 1984), where the court, in connec-
tion with denying unemployment benefits to a dismissed worker, the state forum consid-
ered it irrelevant that other employees had not been dismissed for the same activity.
Nevertheless, the state determination that dismissal was justified establishes that there
was a legitimate purpose for the dismissal under Title VII. As to whether claim preclu-
sion would be applicable, see infra notes 146-72 and accompanying text.
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claimed before the unemployment compensation board that he had
been the victim of unlawful discrimination and that issue was nec-
essarily decided by the board,13 8 one must examine how unlawful
discrimination is defined by the statute or regulations the agency is
authorized to enforce. Specifically, with respect to the denial of
unemployment benefits, one must determine the basis on which the
board would find an otherwise just discharge to be the product of
discriminatory conduct. 39 If the state standard is not as broad as
Title VII, the state judgment should not have preclusive effect on
the legal question of discrimination under Title VII. 14
Furthermore, even if these elements of issue preclusion are satis-
fied, it may be appropriate to ask whether there was an incentive to
litigate fully. Thus, if a particularly small amount was at stake
before the unemployment compensation board, the litigant might
138. See, e.g., Burney v. Polk Community College, 34 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA)
727 (1 1th Cir. 1984) (dismissed counselor raised racial discrimination as defense in pro-
ceedings before hearing conducted by community college's board of trustees--dismissal
upheld by state reviewing court); Ross v. Comsat, 34 Fed. Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 260
(D. Md. 1984) (allegation of sexual harassment actually litigated and decided by unem-
ployment compensation board); Gonsalves v. Alpine Country Club, 563 F. Supp. 1283
(D.R.I. 1983), affid, 727 F.2d 27 (1st Cir. 1984).
139. An analogous problem of issue preclusion exists with respect to determinations
made by the NLRB. Section 8(a)(3) of the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C.
§ 158(a)(3) (1982), makes it an unfair labor practice to discriminate "in regard to hire or
tenure of employment or any term or condition of employment to encourage or discour-
age membership in any labor organization .... ." In Tipler v. E.I. duPont de Nemours
& Co., 443 F.2d 125 (1971), the employer maintained that a finding of no unlawful dis-
crimination by the NLRB was binding on the employee's subsequent Title VII action for
unlawful discharge. Yet, with respect to the NLRA, discrimination is prohibited if it
interferes with the employees' right to act in concert; Title VII prohibits discrimination in
employment without regard to the effect on the employees' right to unite. Since the stan-
dard for discrimination under the two statutes was different, the court held that issue
preclusion was inapplicable. See generally Vestal & Hill, Preclusion in Labor Controver-
sies, 35 OKLA. L. REv. 281 (1982); Note, Res Judicata in Successive Employment Dis-
crimination Suits, 1980 U. ILL. L.F. 1049.
140. Thus, if the state employs a restrictive intent standard, a finding of no discrimi-
nation should not be binding with respect to one's Title VII rights. Although this is
usually not a problem with respect to state FEP agencies, which often embrace Title VII's
disparate impact standard (e.g., Iowa Dep't of Social Services v. Iowa Merit Employment
Dep't, 13 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1332 (Iowa 1976); Giles v. Family Court of
Delaware, 411 A.2d 599 (Del. 1980)), state agencies that are not responsible for enforcing
their own state's fair employment practices statute may not employ such evidentiary stan-
dards.
In addition, the federal court would have to consider any other factors a state court
would in determining the preclusive effect of the prior state determination. For example,
it should be decided whether the parties had the incentive and opportunity to litigate the
matter fully or whether the burden of persuasion was different in the agency proceeding
from that of the Title VII action.
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not be precluded under state law principles since he did not have
the incentive to litigate fully.
Of course, even assuming that a state judgment is not binding on
the legal question of discrimination under Title VII, certain find-
ings of fact may be. 14 ' In the Knox case, the referee made certain
findings of fact. They included findings that (1) Knox had been
absent on a number of occasions; (2) that he had failed to request
time off in writing; and (3) that he was dismissed on January 4th
after an unexcused absence on the prior day. 42 All these findings
were necessary to the unemployment compensation board's deter-
mination that Knox was not entitled to unemployment benefits.
Accordingly, under general state principles of preclusion, they
would be binding on Knox in subsequent litigation.
As with preclusion of legal issues, the federal court must be at-
tentive to what factual issues were actually decided and necessary
to the prior state judgment. For example, in Davis v. United States
Steel Supply, 143 the state appellate court reversed the agency on its
legal finding of unlawful discharge. Apparently, of all the factual
determinations, the state court set aside only one as being clearly
erroneous. '" That particular factual determination was unrelated
to the charge of unlawful termination, and accordingly, should not
have had a binding effect in a subsequent action. 45  Even if the
court had set aside a factual finding related to the termination is-
141. The traditional view of preclusion did not give binding effect to findings of "evi-
dentiary fact," only to an "ultimate fact" or issue of law. The modem view rejects the
distinction between ultimate and evidentiary facts and treats as binding those issues actu-
ally decided and essential to the judgment. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS
§ 27 comment j (1982); C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 9, § 4471, at 110.
142. Knox v. Cornell Univ., 30 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 433, 434 (N.D.N.Y.
1982).
143. 688 F.2d 166 (3d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1014 (1983); see supra notes
128-31 and accompanying text.
144. Davis, 688 F.2d at 169, 187.
145. In this regard, the result in Davis is particularly interesting. In her Title VII
action, the employee alleged discriminatory conduct in basically two respects. 688 F.2d
at 169. First, she alleged that employer's supervisors tacitly condoned and failed to cor-
rect a pattern of racial abuse directed at her by co-workers. Second, she alleged that in
response to her complaints of racial harassment, she was discharged and that this dis-
charge constituted unlawful discrimination. The agency determined that under munici-
pal law she had been unlawfully discharged. The agency's findings of fact included:
5. The first year of complainant's employment went without major incident,
but beginning in 1966 Complainant experienced difficulties with other employ-
ees and was the victim of name calling (i.e., racial slurs) and suffered damage to
personal property, the only employee to experience such.
6. Complainant had, on several occasions, reported the incidents to her imme-
diate supervisor but in all cases little or no credence was given them, with the
word of the other employees taken for value.
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sue, it is questionable whether issue preclusion should apply. Since
the reviewing court also determined that the agency's findings did
not constitute unlawful discrimination under state law, the reversal
of factual findings arguably would not be essential to the judgment,
and therefore, not binding.
Similarly, if a state court reverses an agency finding of discrimi-
nation on the grounds of a procedural deficiency, the court has not
rejected the findings of fact. Accordingly, the court judgment dis-
missing the discrimination claim would not, under principles of is-
sue preclusion, bar litigation of those factual issues in a subsequent
Title VII case since no factual determinations were made by the
state court that were essential to its judgment.
b. Identity of claims
Under state law principles of claim preclusion, a final judgment
on the merits precludes litigation of all matters arising from a com-
mon core of operative facts that could have been raised in the prior
proceeding, as well as those actually decided and necessary to the
judgment. It is not significant, for preclusion purposes, that the
rights complainant believes have been violated derive from differ-
ent statutes or common law theories of relief.' 46  If he failed to
7. Complainant experienced difficulties in the Flexograph Room and was
transferred to the File Room but the difficulties continued.
8. On February 2, 1970, when Complainant went to the then acting manager
to complain concerning damage to her boots, she was summarily dismissed
from the employment of the United States Steel Supply Division.
9. The Complainant was dismissed on the spot and no apparent effort was
made to determine the validity of her complaint of the incident.
10. Various employee conflicts apparently occurred in the office where Com-
plainant worked and the supervisor and management appeared unable or un-
willing to ameliorate these employee problems. On investigation by
Commission on Human Relations staff after the dismissal of the employee, it
appeared that Complainant's records were kept in a different fashion than the
records of other employees, and letters involving other employees, critical of
Complainant, were kept in the Complainant's file.
Id. at 169-70.
The reviewing court, in reversing the agency, apparently found that only the sixth
finding was clearly erroneous. Id. at 187. But let us assume that it set aside all the
factual findings. Assuming that the reviewing court only reversed the agency on the issue
of unlawful discharge, at the very most, only those factual findings necessary to support
that judgment should be binding in the subsequent Title VII action. The factual findings
that related to the allegation that the supervisors condoned and failed to correct a pattern
of racial abuse directed at Davis by her co-workers, that is, findings 5, 6, 7 and 10, would
be irrelevant to the court's judgment and therefore should not be binding under principles
of issue preclusion.
146. Kremer, 456 U.S. at 481 n.22 (res judicata has recently been taken to bar claims
arising from the same transaction even if brought under different statutes).
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assert those matters when he had the opportunity, he cannot do so
in another action.'4 7 Thus, in the context of employment discrimi-
nation, claim preclusion will not depend on whether the party
could have asserted a "Title VII claim" per se in the prior state
proceeding, but whether in seeking relief under state law he could
have raised the discrimination matters Title VII prohibits in the
earlier state proceeding.
To illustrate this point, assume that a transaction or series of
transactions gives rise to federal and state discrimination claims on
the basis of gender and race. Assume further that the claimant
unsuccessfully asserts a claim in state proceedings solely on the
basis of gender discrimination. Since the parties have not litigated
the issue of race discrimination in the prior proceeding, issue pre-
clusion will not bar the federal court from deciding the racial dis-
crimination issue under Title VII. ,48 Yet, since the claimant could
have brought the racial discrimination matter in the state proceed-
ing, he or she will be precluded from bringing the claim in federal
court under principles of claim preclusion. 14 9 Thus, where an indi-
147. Id. at 465 n.4 ("[A] party cannot escape the requirements of full faith and credit
and res judicata by asserting its own failure to raise matters clearly within the scope of a
prior proceeding.").
148. Id. at 466-67 n.6.
149. Id. at 465-67 nn.4 & 6; Lee v. City of Peoria, 685 F.2d 196 (7th Cir. 1982) (since
issue of racial discrimination could have been raised before state proceedings under state
law, plaintiff barred from raising issue under § 1981); Carpenter v. Reed, Civ. No. 83-
1021 (10th Cir. Jan. 11, 1985) (Title VII racial discimination charge precluded if com-
plainant could have raised racial discrimination matter under state law during termina-
tion hearings before state personnel board); C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 9,
§ 4471, at 75. But see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 26(l)(c) (1982) (state
judgment will not have claim preclusive effect with respect to federal claims over which
the state courts lack subject matter jurisdiction even if prior state litigation involved
rights under analogous state statute).
The Supreme Court opinion in Marrese v. American Academy of Orthopaedic Sur-
geons, 53 U.S.L.W. 4265 (U.S. Mar. 5, 1985), is particularly interesting in this regard. In
Marrese, the plaintiffs asserted a federal antitrust claim in federal court even though they
had had the opportunity to raise a comparable state antitrust claim in a prior state court
action. The threshold question before the Seventh Circuit was whether § 1738 was appli-
cable at all. A plurality opinion reasoned that since state courts have no jurisdiction over
federal antitrust claims, the claim preclusive effect of the prior state judgment had to be
determined by federal preclusion principles, not those of the rendering state. Applying
federal preclusion principles, the court went on to conclude that since plaintiffs could
have raised the antitrust matter under state law in the prior proceeding, they could not
subsequently assert their federal antitrust claim in federal court. It was immateral, for
preclusion purposes, that the state forum lacked the competence to hear federal antitrust
claims. Because of the similarity between the state antitrust matters they could have
raised in state court and the federal antitrust matters they sought to raise in the subse-
quent federal action, the Seventh Circuit held that principles of claim preclusion applied.
The Supreme Court stated that the Seventh Circuit had erred in assuming that § 1738
did not apply to claims within the federal courts' exclusive jurisdiction. Even where the
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vidual's rights under the state discrimination law are as broad as
those provided by Title VII, an individual who pursues his state
rights through state proceedings will be precluded from subse-
quently bringing a Title VII claim in federal court.1 50 Simply
claim sought to be precluded is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the federal courts, the
federal courts must first look to state preclusion law in determining the claim preclusive
effect of a prior state court judgment. If under state law the claim would be barred, the
federal court should then, and only then, consider whether Congress intended to im-
pliedly repeal § 1738 with respect to federal antitrust laws.
The Court's holding that § 1738 applies to federal claims within the federal courts'
exclusive jurisdiction is not surprising in light of its Kremer opinion. In the context of
issue preclusion the Kremer Court had held that § 1738 applied regardless of whether the
federal courts have exclusive or concurrent jurisdiction over Title VII claims. Marrese
simply extended Kremer to claim preclusion.
In another respect, however, the Marrese opinion suggests a departure from the reason-
ing of the Kremer decision. In Marrese, the Court states that general state law principles
will not accord claim preclusive effect where the state court lacks the competence to hear
rights arising under a particular statute. Thus, it assumes that state law will not preclude
federal antitrust claims even though the state court had the competence to hear analo-
gous state antitrust claims. Marrese, 53 U.S.L.W. at 4267 & n.3. In Kremer, however,
the Court stated that under general principles of claim preclusion, claims arising from the
same transaction are precluded even though they may arise under different statutes.
Kremer, 456 U.S. at 465 n.4. Thus, if a plaintiff failed to raise a matter arising under one
statute, he could not raise the same matter in subsequent litigation even if that matter
arose under a different statute: all discrimination matters that could have been raised in
the prior litigation are precluded. For example, in Kremer itself, the New York State fair
employment practices agency did not have the jurisdiction to adjudicate rights arising
under Title VII; its authority extended only to claims arising under the state's human
rights law. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court held that application of state issue preclu-
sion principles was mandated by § 1738.
In the wake of Kremer, federal courts have invoked claim preclusion regardless of
whether the state forum had the competence to hear a Title VII claim as such. Thus, if,
in a prior state proceeding, a discharged employee failed to raise a state discrimination
charge identical to that under Title VII, federal courts have held that, under the mandate
of § 1738, he is precluded from subsequently bringing a Title VII claim in federal court.
See notes 146-172 and accompanying text.
Contrary to the assumption made by the Supreme Court in Marrese, then, it is far from
clear that state law principles will not invoke claim preclusion with respect to federal
statutory rights that state courts lack the competence to hear if those courts have the
competence to hear identical state matters. If state law principles would invoke claim
preclusion under such circumstances, the Supreme Court will have to resolve the ques-
tion it did not have to address in Marrese; that is, whether § 1738 is partially repealed
with respect to claim preclusion of federal antitrust matters. Similarly, the Court may be
called upon to address the specific issue of claim preclusion in the context of Title VII,
that is, if the state courts lack the competence to hear claims arising specifically under
Title VII, should a federal court give effect to state claim preclusion principles that would
bar the litigation of rights arising under Title VII because the complainant failed to assert
the identical matters under state law in the prior state proceeding.
150. Whether the rights under state law are broader than those under Title VII de-
pends on several factors. These factors include the classes protected, the type and extent
of relief available, whether actual discriminatory intent must be demonstrated, the bur-
dens of persuasion, and the extent of exceptions such as bona fide occupational qualifica-
tions. Since the complainant's right arising under Title VII might be greater in some
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stated, the individual could have raised those discrimination mat-
ters covered by Title VII within the state system.
Where the rights under Title VII are broader than those under
state law, one must determine whether the state court had the au-
thority to hear the matter peculiar to Title VII. For this purpose,
it is useful to inquire into whether the complainant appealed an
agency determination to state court,' 51 or whether he sought direct
judicial redress. In the situations where the complainant appealed
a state agency determination, the scope of the state court's jurisdic-
tion on review is determined by state law. As a general rule, the
reviewing court's jurisdiction will be no broader than the
agency's;5 2 the agency, in turn, is limited to hearing those matters
the state legislature has given it the authority to hear.15 3 Thus, if
the FEP agency cannot hear matters peculiar to Title VII, the re-
viewing court's jurisdiction will be similarly limited. Accordingly,
the complainant's right to a de novo trial on those substantive Title
VII matters that are broader than the rights afforded under state
law is preserved.
Where the complainant seeks direct judicial redress, however,
the state court's jurisdiction may not be so limited. Rather, it may
have concurrent jurisdiction to adjudicate Title VII rights. If it
does, and that, of course, is a question of federal law, those broader
aspects of Title VII could have been raised in the prior state court
proceeding, and therefore, cannot be litigated in a subsequent
action.
i. Where the complainant appeals an agency determination to
the state reviewing court
Often a complainant will seek state redress of his employment
claim before a state fair employment practices agency with the spe-
respects than others, the federal court judge should examine all relevant aspects. For
example, a state might provide for more extensive relief than Title VII. Yet, if compara-
ble worth is not accepted as a theory of recovery under state law, as it may be under Title
VII, the standard of liability would be narrower. Thus, even if the state proceedings have
rejected complainant's state FEP claim, he should not be barred from raising a theory of
comparable worth under Title VII.
151. With respect to whether an employee should be precluded from litigating his
Title VII claim de novo where the employer sought court review, see infra notes 212-38
and accompanying text.
152. See Local 1006 v. Wurf, 558 F. Supp. 230, 239-40 (N.D. Iln. 1982) (interpreting
North Dakota law); Mortenson v. Syracuse Univ., 46 A.D.2d 1002, 362 N.Y.S.2d 104
(1974).
153. Other courts may authorize the reviewing court to hear additional matters. See
Lee v. City of Peoria, 685 F.2d 196, 201 (7th Cir. 1982) (interpreting Illinois law).
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cific authority to resolve disputes arising under the state's fair em-
ployment statute. 54 In other cases, the complainant may first raise
his charge of discrimination before a non-FEP agency such as an
unemployment compensation board or a state personnel board
which is not primarily responsible for the enforcement of the
state's discrimination laws. In both situations, agency adjudica-
tions are typically subject to only a deferential standard of re-
view.155 Yet, as Kremer firmly establishes, a de novo adjudication
by the state reviewing court is not necessary for the court judgment
to have preclusive effect in the complainant's subsequent Title VII
action as long as the rendering state would give it preclusive
effect. "'56
Even under state preclusion rules, the state judgment only pre-
cludes those matters that could have been raised in the state sys-
tem.' "57 Accordingly, where the agency did not have the
jurisdiction to hear the matters covered by Title VII and the re-
viewing court is limited to the agency record,' the right to a fed-
eral trial de novo on those matters is not affected.' 59 Thus, if an
154. This pattern is not at all unusual since the procedural scheme of Title VII re-
quires deferral to state and local FEP agencies.
155. E.g., GA. CODE §§ 45-19-39(b)(5) to 39(b)(6) (Michie Supp. 1984) (state court
shall uphold special master's order unless it is arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discre-
tion, or unsupported by substantial evidence); N.Y. EXEC. LAW §§ 297, 298 (McKinney
1982); N.Y. CIv. PRAC. LAW. § 7803(3)(4) (1982); OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 4112.06(E)
(Page 1980) (Commissioner's findings will be conclusive if supported by reliable, proba-
tive and substantive evidence in the record). But see MICH. STAT. ANN. § 3.548(606)
(Callaghan 1984) (de novo review).
Even within a state the standard of review applied to state and local FEP agencies may
differ. For example, in Nebraska, the state court has only limited power of review with
respect to the Lincoln City FEP agency and yet broader review powers with respect to
the state FEP agency and other local FEP agencies. Willborn, supra note 125, at 707-08.
156. Not surprisingly, the federal court may disagree as to the preclusive effect the
state court will give its own judgment. See Allen v. Greenville County, 712 F.2d 934 (4th
Cir. 1983).
Even within a state, judgments of a reviewing court may be treated differently for pur-
poses of claim preclusion. Under Nebraska law an affirmance of a local FEP agency of
no discrimination has no preclusive effect, while that of a state FEP agency does. There-
fore, whether a complainant's Title VII claim will be precluded may ultimately turn on
with which of two agencies within the state the complainant happened to file. Wiiborn,
supra note 125, at 722-23 n. 122 and accompanying text.
157. See Loudermill v. Cleveland Bd. of Educ., 721 F.2d 550, 559 n.13 (6th Cir.
1983) (federal court could hear procedural due process claim since under Ohio law the
state administrative agency lacked the authority to hear it), affd, 53 U.S.L.W. (U.S. Mar.
19, 1985).
158. See supra note 152.
159. New York Gaslight Club, Inc. v. Carey, 447 U.S. 54 (1980); Rawson v. Sears,
Roebuck & Co., 554 F. Supp. 327 (D. Colo. 1983); ef Unger v. Consolidated Foods
Corp., 693 F.2d 703 (7th Cir. 1982); Gonsalves v. Alpine Country Club, 727 F.2d 27 (1st
Cir. 1984) (state statute was at least as broad as Title VII thereby justifying issue preclu-
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individual is entitled only to a cease and desist order under the
state FEP scheme and he prevails on the state level, basic rules of
preclusion do not treat his entire claim as merged with his state
judgment."6 Since he could not have asserted a claim in the state
agency for back pay, the individual is still entitled to seek such
relief in federal court under Title VII.U 16' In addition, where the
prior forum did not have the jurisdiction to hear a particular the-
ory of relief, a party is not precluded from raising it in a subse-
quent forum. 62 Of course, with respect to legal and factual issues
that were actually decided and necessary to the state judgment,
issue preclusion would apply. 163
Assume, however, that complainant failed to raise an issue he
could have raised before the state agency, such as racial discrimi-
nation. Further assume that the reviewing court is limited to hear-
ing matters that were raised below. Does the judgment of the
reviewing court have preclusive effect with respect to the racial dis-
crimination issue that could have been raised before the agency?
In other words, for purposes of claim preclusion in a subsequent
Title VII action, does one look to the jurisdiction of the agency or
of that of the reviewing court?
Courts, in the wake of Kremer, have focused on the scope of the
agency's authority to determine the preclusive effect of the review-
ing court's judgment. In Carpenter v. Reed,' 6 for example, the
sion); Reynolds v. New York State Dep't of Correctional Services, 568 F. Supp. 747
(S.D.N.Y. 1983) (Title VII broader than state FEP statute).
160. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 26(l)(c) & comment d (1982).
161. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 85 comment a (1982); Boykins v.
Ambridge Area School Dist., 621 F.2d 75 (3d Cir. 1980) (where a state forum could not
have awarded damages, federal civil rights claim is different for claim preclusion
purposes).
162. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 26(l)(c) (1982); Rawson v. Sears,
Roebuck & Co., 554 F. Supp. 327, 329 n.1 (D. Colo. 1983) (issue of age discrimination
was unlikely to have been resolved fully before unemployment compensation board); Da-
vis, 688 F.2d at 183-85 (Gibbons, J., dissenting).
If there is any question as to the scope of the agency's authority, a cautious litigant will
raise all potential theories of relief on the agency level. Otherwise, when he commences
his federally-based action, he may find that since the agency could have heard the dis-
crimination matter, he is precluded from raising it in federal court.
163. Abramson v. Pennwood Inv. Corp., 392 F.2d 759, 762 (2d Cir. 1968) (complaint
based on Securities Exchange Act § 10(b) not barred under res judicata by prior state
court action based on claim of breach of fiduciary duty although plaintiff would be es-
topped from relitigating facts determined in prior proceeding).
164. Civ. No. 83-1021 (10th Cir. Jan. 11, 1985). On December 21, 1984 the court
had withdrawn its original opinion to correct a clerical oversight. Since then, the court
has vacated the district court's judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings
to determine the actual scope of the state agency's jurisdiction over discrimination mat-
ters. If nothing else, Carpenter illustrates the need for the federal district court to know
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plaintiffs had been dismissed from their positions as state highway
patrolmen. They appealed their dismissal to the Oklahoma State
Personnel Board which upheld the dismissals on the ground that
the plaintiffs had violated department policy. The dismissed em-
ployees did not allege before the personnel board, however, that
their dismissals were a result of racial discrimination. When they
subsequently brought a Title VII and section 1981 claim alleging
racial discrimination, the federal district court invoked claim pre-
clusion. In its view, the personnel board had the authority to hear
allegations of racial discrimination under Oklahoma's civil rights
statute. Having failed to raise it before the personnel board, they
were precluded from raising it under Title VII or section 1981. On
appeal, the Tenth Circuit ultimately remanded the case for further
proceedings to determine whether the personnel board actually
had the jurisdiction to hear the state discrimination matters. Yet,
even under the rationale of the appellate court, the critical state
forum for purposes of claim preclusion was the state agency; if
plaintiffs could have raised the matters before the state agency,
they could not do so in their Title VII action. 6 5
The Kremer decision makes it clear, however, that with respect
to Title VII rights, it is only the state court judgment, not the
agency determination, that has preclusive effect. The agency deter-
mination, in and of itself, has none. Thus, to rest preclusion on the
scope of the state administrative hearing is at odds with the
Kremer rationale that it is the state court judgment that has claim
preclusion effect. So even if the rendering state would give the ju-
dicial judgment preclusive effect with respect to matters not raised
at the agency level, it is questionable whether the federal court
should do so with respect to Title VII matters. Rather, the federal
court should focus on the scope of the state court's reviewing au-
thority. If the plaintiffs in the prior state action could have raised a
discrimination matter covered by Title VII before the state review-
ing court, but failed to do so, claim preclusion would be appropri-
ate. If they could not, claim preclusion, at least with respect to
their Title VII rights, would be inconsistent with the Kremer
the exact interrelationship between state agencies responsible for administering the state's
fair employment practices statute.
165. Id. Accord Local 1006 v. Wurf, 558 F. Supp. 230, 239 (N.D. Ill. 1982). There,
the state reviewing court refused to pass on complainants' claim that they had been dis-
missed as a result of an unlawful conspiracy since the conspiracy theory had not been
raised in the agency below. Claim preclusion nevertheless applied since the agency could
have heard the charge if they had raised it. See also Frazier v. East Baton Rouge Parish
School Bd., 363 F.2d 861 (5th Cir. 1966) (failure of teacher to raise racial discrimination
issue before school board precludes her from raising issue in subsequent § 1983 action).
252 [Vol. 16
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rationale. 166
Finally, it should be noted that the scope of a state's claim pre-
clusion law may also bar discrimination issues that could have
been raised as counterclaims in the state proceeding. Generally,
under the mandate of section 1738, a federal court will give effect
to the rendering state's compulsory counterclaim rule. 167 Thus, an
employee who failed to assert a compulsory discrimination coun-
terclaim is barred from raising the same matter in federal court.
The question remains, however, whether he will be so precluded
absent a compulsory counterclaim rule.
The general rules of preclusion do not require an individual to
assert permissive counterclaims in the forum selected by the plain-
tiff; one can preserve one's counterclaim for the forum of one's
choice. 6 8 An important exception, however, applies to those coun-
terclaims that would undermine the integrity of the first judg-
ment. 169  This exception might be invoked to preclude
discrimination claims that the employee failed to assert as a coun-
terclaim in the state proceedings.
Assume that an employer commences a state administrative
hearing to dismiss an employee on the ground of inadequate per-
formance. The employee does not assert employer discrimination
either as an affirmative defense or a counterclaim, and offers no
evidence to that effect. Thus, the issue of discriminatory conduct is
neither litigated nor decided on the administrative level. The
agency, though, does determine that good cause for the discharge
existed. On the basis of the agency record below, the state review-
ing court affirms the agency's decision. In his subsequent Title VII
166. Consistent with this approach, if, under state law, a reviewing court could hear
matters the agency would not even have the authority to hear, claim preclusion would be
applicable. See Lee v. City of Peoria, 685 F.2d 196 (7th Cir. 1982); Umberfield v. School
Dist. No. 11, 522 P.2d 730 (Colo. 1974) (reviewing court empowered to hear state law
discrimination matters not raised below).
167. E.g., Texas Gulf Citrus & Cattle Co. v. Kelly, 591 F.2d 439 (8th Cir. 1979);
Trimmel v. General Electric Credit Corp., 555 F. Supp. 264 (D. Conn. 1983); A. VEs-
TAL, RES JUDICATA/PRECLUSION 163-71 (1969); C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER supra note
9, § 4467, at 643 (1981); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 22 (1982); contra
Chapman v. Aetna Fin. Co., 615 F.2d 361 (5th Cir. 1980). The counterclaim rule may be
distinguished from other "procedural" rules in that it is designed not only for the proce-
dural convenience of the first forum, but also, to further the value of repose by adjudicat-
ing all related claims.
168. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 22(1) (1982). Of course, to the ex-
tent that matters comprising the counterclaim were actually litigated and necessarily de-
termined, principles of issue preclusion apply.
169. Martino v. McDonald's Sys., Inc., 598 F.2d 1079 (7th Cir. 1979). See generally
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 22(b) (1982); Atwood, supra note 77, at 88-
91.
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action, should the employee be prevented from asserting his feder-
ally-based discrimination charge because he failed to assert an
identical state counterclaim in state proceedings? Stated otherwise,
should preclusion be invoked on the ground that a favorable ruling
on his discrimination discharge would vitiate the state determina-
tion that his employment had been terminated for good cause?17 °
A finding of good cause for termination is not necessarily under-
mined by a finding of job discrimination. In the first instance, the
employer may have good cause to dismiss the employee within the
terms of the employee's labor contract. Notwithstanding the con-
tract, however, the employer's conduct may be discriminatory
within the terms of Title VII.171 Thus, to permit the Title VII ac-
tion to proceed would not necessarily vitiate the good cause deter-
mination by the state court.
This criticism aside, the application of the counterclaim preclu-
sion rule is unobjectionable only to the extent that the state review-
ing court had jurisdiction to consider the state discrimination
matters as broad as those under Title VII. If it could not have
determined issues of unlawful discrimination identical to or at least
as broad as Title VII, the counterclaim rule is not applicable and
the state finding of good cause for dismissal should not bar litiga-
tion of the Title VII claim. 72
ii. Where complainant had sought direct judicial redress
The prior state judicial determination raised by defendant in the
Title VII action may have been based on a full de novo adjudica-
tion of the issues in dispute. Rather than simply review the
170. These facts are based on those in Lee v. City of Peoria, 685 F.2d 196 (7th Cir.
1982). In Lee, however, the employee apparently raised the discrimination counterclaim
for the first time on review. The reviewing court, though, took no evidence on the issue
and, indeed, there was some question whether it could have heard the discrimination
claim since the employee did not raise it before the agency. Nevertheless, the Seventh
Circuit considered the discrimination matter to have been actually litigated and decided
by the state reviewing court. Accordingly, it applied state principles of issue preclusion.
As an alternate rationale, however, it rested its decision on claim preclusion. In its view,
even if the discrimination counterclaim had not been litigated, a favorable determination
on the discrimination charge now would vitiate the prior state judgment.
171. See discussion of McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273 (1976)
supra note 114; see also Stewart v. Wappingers Cent. School Dist., 23 Fair Empl. Prac.
Cas. (BNA) 231 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (fact that FEP agency found no discriminatory dis-
charge does not mean that no breach of contract existed since that question was not
before the agency).
172. See Rawson v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 554 F. Supp. 327 (D. Colo. 1983). There,
complainant could assert age discrimination claim notwithstanding previous state deter-
mination of rightful discharge. Claim preclusion did not apply since the State Industrial
Commission could not grant the relief requested under federal law.
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agency's finding, the state court may have been the primary
factfinder. This can occur in several ways. Some state fair employ-
ment practices statutes permit complainants direct judicial re-
dress. 173 Others have a waiting period comparable to that in Title
VII during which time the state agency has the opportunity to re-
solve the discrimination claim. Once the period has elapsed, the
complainant may initiate a civil action and have his state fair em-
ployment claim adjudicated de novo.' 74 Aside from these possibili-
ties, a complainant may have asserted in a state action only his
common law claims arising from the alleged discriminatory prac-
tices. 75 Suppose that in each case, the complainant was unsuccess-
ful. Having litigated his state statutory or common law claims in
state court, what should the preclusive effect be with respect to his
Title VII rights?176
Clearly, the complainant is barred from raising matters under
Title VII that are identical to those rejected by the state court.
Yet, if the federal court determines that Title VII is broader in
some respects than the rights available under state laws, it must
then decide if the state courts have concurrent jurisdiction over
Title VII claims.177 Only if the state court has concurrent jurisdic-
tion over Title VII claims would those broader Title VII issues be
precluded by the state judgment.
Title VII expressly authorizes the federal courts to adjudicate
claims arising under the statute.1 78 Indeed, the Supreme Court has
stated, on more than one occasion, that Congress intended the final
173. E.g., 1984 MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 37.2801-03 (West Supp. 1984); N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 10:5-13 (West Supp. 1982); N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 297 (McKinney 1982); 43
PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 962(c) (Purdon Supp. 1984).
174. CAL. Gov'T CODE § 12965(b) (West 1980) (judicial action permitted after wait-
ing period of 150 days); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 151B, § 9 (West 1982) (civil action
permitted after expiration of 90 days).
Still other jurisdictions provide for a de novo review of the claim after exhaustion of
administrative remedies. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 44-1011 (1981) (reviewing court can re-
ceive additional evidence and is charged with making an independent finding); MICH.
COMP. LAWS ANN. § 37.2606 (West Supp. 1984); MICH. STAT. ANN. § 3.548(606)(1)
(Callaghan 1980) (trial de novo of agency determination).
175. E.g., Kotzik v. Young, 704 F.2d 149 (4th Cir. 1984).
176. The same question arises with respect to federal rights the complainant actually
litigated or could have litigated. To the extent that those rights are co-extensive with
Title VII, preclusion principles bar him from litigating his Title VII rights. If Title VII is
broader, one must determine whether the state court could have heard the Title VII
matters.
177. If, under state law, a reviewing court can hear any additional claims the appeal-
ing party may have, including those under federal law, the following discussion on exclu-
sive and concurrent jurisdiction may apply as well.
178. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f) (1982).
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responsibility for enforcement of Title VII to rest with the federal
courts. 179 The Court, however, has never determined whether the
federal court's jurisdiction is exclusive of the state's.
That Congress expressly grants to the federal courts the jurisdic-
tion to adjudicate claims arising under a particular federal statute
does not, in and of itself, prevent state courts from exercising con-
current jurisdiction.18 On the contrary, there is a presumption
that concurrent jurisdiction exists. 8 ' This presumption can be re-
butted by explicit statutory directive, by unmistakable implication
from legislative history, or clear incompatibility between state
court jurisdiction and federal interest.' 82
When Congress enacted Title VII, it did not expressly provide
for exclusive jurisdiction. s3 The statute itself authorizes complain-
ant to commence a "civil action" upon receipt of his right-to-sue
letter; it does not specify a federal action.'84 Thus, there is no ex-
plicit statutory directive rebutting the presumption of concurrent
jurisdiction. Further, there is no clear incompatibility between
state court jurisdiction and the federal interest. On the contrary,
Congress expressly provided for limited deferral to adequate state
remedies. In its view, both the states and the federal government
were critical in the fight against employment discrimination. Thus,
if exclusive jurisdiction is to be found at all, it must be found by
implication.
While it is true that an express provision for federal jurisdiction
does not deprive the state courts of concurrent jurisdiction, Title
VII does more than simply confer jurisdiction on the federal
courts. It makes detailed references to the federal procedures to be
used once the action is commenced. Thus, it provides for the ap-
pointment of a special master in accordance with Federal Rule 53
179. Kremer, 456 U.S. at 477-78; Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 44
(1974); see also New York Gaslight Club, Inc. v. Carey, 447 U.S. 54, 64 (1980) (the
ultimate authority to secure compliance with Title VII resides in the federal courts).
In Kremer the Court specifically refrained from deciding whether the federal courts
have exclusive jurisdiction over Title VII. 456 U.S. at 506 n.20. Nonetheless, in language
reminiscent of that in earlier cases, the Court stated again that the federal courts have
final responsibility for enforcing Title VII. Id. at 477-78.
180. Charles Dowd Box Co. v. Courtney, 368 U.S. 502 (1962).
181. Chaffin v. Houseman, 93 U.S. 130 (1876); 3 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E.
COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3527 (1972).
182. Gulf Offshore Co. v. Mobil Oil Corp., 453 U.S. 473 (1981).
183. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f) (1982), provides that the federal district court shall have
jurisdiction over actions brought under Title VII, but it does not specify that it shall be
exclusive of the states.
184. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e) (1982).
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if the Title VII claim cannot be tried within 120 days; 85 that ap-
peals are subject to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291, 1292;86 and that injunctive
relief be issued in accordance with Rule 65.187 Do these specific
references to federal procedure imply that Congress intended the
federal courts to have exclusive jurisdiction over Title VII claims?
Arguably, these provisions merely reflect Congress's concern
with the workings of the federal system. Rather than reflecting a
preference for exclusive federal adjudication, the lack of reference
to state courts merely indicates that Congress was unconcerned
with, and indeed has no authority over, the workings of the state
judicial system. By setting forth certain procedures it could ensure
the speedy adjudication of claims brought to federal court. It did
not necessarily intend to strip the state courts of what would other-
wise be concurrent jurisdiction. Thus, the argument is made that
although the federal courts might be the primary enforcers of Title
VII rights, they are not necessarily the sole enforcers. 8 8
Moreover, when Congress authorized the Attorney General to
seek injunctive relief against discriminatory patterns and practices,
it made specific reference to bringing the "civil action in the appro-
priate district court of the United States."' ' 9 With respect to pri-
vate civil suits, however, no such reference is made. Some lower
federal courts have seized upon this difference as evidence that
Congress did not intend the federal courts to have exclusive juris-
diction over private Title VII claims. 190
185. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(5) (1982).
186. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(j) (1982).
187. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5() (1982). In addition, § 706(0(3) contains special venue
provisions that identify the judicial district in which the action is to be brought. This
provision may also evince congressional intent to give the federal court exclusive jurisdic-
tion. See generally C. SULLIVAN, M. ZIMMER & R. RICHARDS, supra note 22, at § 3.14.
188. Willborn, supra note 125, at 735-37.
189. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(l) (1982).
190. E.g., Bennum v. Board of Governors of Rutgers Univ., 413 F. Supp. 1274, 1279
(D.N.J. 1976).
In this regard one might question whether the federal courts have a unique expertise
that would speak in favor of exclusive jurisdiction. Since many states have fair employ-
ment statutes similar to Title VII, one could argue that state court judges are familiar
with the legal principles that arise under Title VII. See Note, Exclusive Jurisdiction of the
Federal Courts in Private Civil Actions, 70 HARV. L. REV. 509, 515 (1957) (that antitrust
laws, because of the fact that state courts frequently enforce similar state laws, may more
appropriately be made concurrent). But see Klein v. American Luggage Works, Inc.,
206 F. Supp. 924 (D. Del.) rev'd on other grounds, 323 F. 2d 787 (3d Cir. 1962); Otis
Elevator Co. v. Reynolds, 81 Misc. 2d 314, 366 N.Y.S.2d 256 (Sup. Ct. 1975) (federal
courts have impliedly found exclusive jurisdiction over Sherman antitrust claims notwith-
standing comparable state statutes).
Another factor to be considered where Congress is silent on the subject is whether a
need for uniform application of Title VII supports a finding of exclusive jurisdiction. See
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One may equally argue that the references to federal procedure
reflected an assumption that the federal courts would be the ulti-
mate and only judicial enforcers of Title VII rights. For example,
section 706, which authorizes the bringing of a private "civil ac-
tion," goes on to provide that the court may appoint counsel for
complainant and permit commencement of the action without pay-
ment of fees, costs, or security."' Another provision designed also
for the complainant's benefit is the preference for referral to a spe-
cial master to hear the case.'92 It is fair to say that Congress
viewed the procedural mechanisms contained in Title VII as an
integral part of a complainant's rights under Title VII. 193 Yet,
Congress could have no control over state court operations. Ac-
cordingly, the implication can be drawn that Congress intended
the cases to be brought in the federal courts.
In addition, the 1964 legislation is replete with references to the
federal courts' role in the adjudication of Title VII rights. In this
regard, the original House version provided that if conciliation
failed and the EEOC failed to bring suit, the complainant could
bring a civil action in a "U.S. district court." In explaining the
House bill, the Clark-Case interpretive memorandum made specific
reference to the aggrieved party bringing his claim in federal
court. 194 Admittedly, the final Senate version that was ultimately
adopted by the House dropped the reference to "U.S. district
court" and just reads "a civil action." One might argue that the
change constitutes a preference for concurrent jurisdiction, but no
reference is made to it in either Senator Humphrey's or Senator
Dirksen's explanation of the Senate changes. I95 Indeed, the main
focus of the changes in that part of the bill concerned the deferral
to state and local agencies. Both Senators seemed to assume that
the federal courts would hear the charge after the EEOC issued its
generally Redish & Muench, Adjudication of Federal Causes of Action in State Court, 75
MICH. L. REV. 311, 331-34 (1976) (exclusive jurisdiction to be implied with respect to
those statutes that give the judiciary wide latitude in developing federal rights, whereas
concurrent jurisdiction is appropriate where the scope of the federal right is clearly
detailed).
191. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1982).
192. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(5) (1982).
193. 110 CONG. REC. 12721-25 (remarks of Sen. Javits), 1964 LEGISLATIVE His-
TORY, supra note 16, at 3004, 3006 (1968).
194. 110 CONG. REC. 7212-15 (1964) (interpretative memorandum on the House bill
H.R. 7152 submitted jointly by Sen. Clark and Sen. Case).
195. See 110 CONG. REC. 12721-25 (1964) (remarks of Sen. Humphrey), 1964 LEGIS-
LATIVE HISTORY, supra note 16, at 3003-08; 110 CONG. REC. 12818-20 (1964) (remarks
of Sen. Dirksen), 1964 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 16, at 3017-21.
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right-to-sue letter.196 In fact, the provision for the federal court
appointing counsel for indigent defendants was introduced in the
Senate version ultimately passed.' 97 The legislative history, then, is
far from clear on this question, and, understandably, the lower fed-
eral courts are sharply split on the issue.' 9
One should also consider whether the remedial purpose of the
statute is better served by exclusive jurisdiction. 9 9 The vindication
of Title VII rights is facilitated where the complainant has the op-
tion to select his forum. In a case where state statutory and com-
mon law claims exist, it may be more convenient and less expensive
for the complainant to join all claims in a state action. Of course, a
complainant may attempt to join his claims in federal court under
the doctrine of pendent jurisdiction.2" However, since the exercise
196. 1964 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 16, at 3004. One reason that the pro-
ponents of Title VII may have assumed that individual suits would be brought in federal
courts was a general doubt, at the time, that the state courts in the south would vigor-
ously enforce civil rights.
197. Id.
198. The only court of appeals to address the issue has held that federal courts have
exclusive jurisdiction over Title VII claims. Valenzuela v. Kraft, Inc., 739 F.2d 434 (9th
Cir. 1984). Accord Dickinson v. Chrysler Corp., 456 F. Supp. 43 (E.D. Mich. 1978); Fox
v. Eaton Corp., 48 Ohio St. 2d 236, 358 N.E.2d 536 (1976); Lucas v. Tanner Bros. Con-
tracting Corp., 10 Fair Empl. Cas. (BNA) 1109 (Ariz. 1974). Contra Greene v. County
School Bd., 524 F. Supp. 43 (E.D. Va. 1981); Bennum v. Bd. of Governors of Rutgers
Univ., 413 F. Supp. 1274 (D.N.J. 1976); Vason v. Carrano, 31 Conn. Supp. 338, 330 A.2d
98 (1974); Peper v. Princeton Univ. Bd. of Trustees, 77 N.J. 55, 389 A.2d 465 (1978).
Commentators have also split on the question. See C. SULLIVAN, M. ZIMMER & R.
RICHARDS, supra note 22, at § 3.14; Atwood, State Court Judgments in Federal Litiga-
tion: Mapping the Contours of Full Faith and Credit, 58 IND. L.J. 59, 104 (1982). Com-
pare Jackson, Matheson & Piskorski, The Proper Role of Res Judicata and Collateral
Estoppel in Title VII Suits, 79 MICH. L. REV. 1485, 1514 n.164 (1981) (federal courts
have exclusive jurisdiction) with Willborn, Employment Discrimination Laws in Ne-
braska: A Procedural Labyrinth, 62 NEB. L. REV. 708, 735-37 (1983) (state courts have
concurrent jurisdiction).
199. In attempting to determine congressional intent on a matter which Congress did
not specifically consider, one should consider the remedial purpose of the statute. United
Steel Workers of Am. AFL-CIO-CLC v. Wever, 443 U.S. 193, 202-04 (1979). See gener-
ally Redish & Muench, Adjudication of Federal Causes ofAction in State Court, 75 MICH.
L. REV. 311, 325 (1976) (advocating case-by-case analysis of the legislative history and
needs of the federal system to determine if states have concurrent jurisdiction over federal
claims).
200. Pendent jurisdiction is a judicially created doctrine that permits a party to join a
claim over which the federal courts do not have subject matter jurisdiction with a claim
the courts do have the authority to hear. As long as the federal and non-federal claims
arise from a common nucleus of operative facts and Congress did not impliedly negate
the right of the federal courts to exercise pendent jurisdiction over the non-federal claims;
that is, those for which there is no independent basis for subject matter jurisdiction, the
courts have the judicial power to exercise jurisdiction over the non-federal claim. A
federal court, though, is not required to exercise pendent jurisdiction. Rather, it must
determine whether in the interest of comity, judicial economy, convenience and fairness
260 Loyola University Law Journal [Vol. 16
of pendent jurisdiction is discretionary, he may not always be able
to do so.2 °1 Especially where the state claims are novel, the federal
courts will probably decline jurisdiction.2 °2 If the state courts were
not to have concurrent jurisdiction, the complainant in such cir-
cumstances would be forced to proceed in two forums. A finding
that federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction, then, would make
the full vindication of one's discrimination claim only more cum-
bersome-a result that Congress surely would have wanted to
avoid.
In addition, litigation in two forums is not simply a burden to
the complainant. It constitutes a waste of judicial resources and is
burdensome to the defendant as well. Furthermore, concurrent ju-
risdiction still gives the parties the option to select a federal forum
for the resolution of the dispute if they so desire. The plaintiff can
initially commence his employment discrimination action in fed-
eral court or, if he does not, the defendant can remove the action to
federal court. Concurrent jurisdiction simply permits the state
courts to adjudicate a Title VII claim if the parties so desire. In
any event, until it is finally established whether state courts have
to the litigants, it is appropriate to exercise pendent jurisdiction in a particular case. See
generally 3 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & C. COOPER, supra note 181, at § 3567; Catania,
State Employment Discrimination Remedies and Pendent Jurisdiction Under Title VII
Access to Federal Courts, 32 AM. U.L. REV. 778, 788-816 (1983).
201. United Mine Workers of Am. v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966).
202. Id. at 726 (in the interest of comity, federal courts should avoid making determi-
nations on unsettled questions of state law). For Title VII actions in which the federal
court declined to exercise pendent jurisdiction because state law was unsettled, see Bell v.
Owens-Coming Fiberglass Corp., 28 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) § 32,589 (D. Kan. 1982);
Lazic v. Univ. of Pa., 513 F. Supp. 761, 770 (E.D. Pa. 1981); Wagner v. Sperry Univac,
458 F. Supp. 505, 515 (E.D. Pa. 1978). See generally Catania, supra note 200, at 808-16.
Indeed, some courts have held that they do not have the judicial power to exercise
pendent jurisdiction over related claims. E.g., Haroldson v. Hospitality Systems, Inc.,
596 F. Supp. 146 (D. Colo. 1984); Jong-Yul Lim v. Int'l Inst. of Metropolitan Detroit,
510 F. Supp. 722 (E.D. Mich. 1981). Contra Phillips v. Smalley Maintenance Services,
Inc., 32 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) § 33,802 (11th Cir. 1983). Although the author agrees
with the Eleventh Circuit holding that federal courts have the judicial power to exercise
pendent jurisdiction over related state claims where the sole basis of subject matter juris-
diction is Title VII, she disagrees with the analysis of the court. The Eleventh Circuit
employed the two-part test of Gibbs, pursuant to which it asked (1) whether the state and
federal claims arose from a common nucleus of operative facts such that the district court
had the constitutional power to exercise pendent jurisdiction; and (2) whether the lower
court abused its discretion in exercising pendent jurisdiction. In the writer's view, the
Eleventh Circuit also should have inquired whether the court below had the statutory
power to exercise jurisdiction, that is, whether Congress in enacting Title VII expressly or
impliedly negated the power of the federal courts to exercise pendent jurisdiction over
related state claims. It is the writer's view that Congress did not impliedly limit pendent
jurisdiction in the Title VII actions, and for this reason, she is in agreement with the
Eleventh Circuit decision.
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concurrent jurisdiction over Title VII claims, this aspect of claim
preclusion will remain unsettled and the preclusive effect of a state
judicial determination with respect to those matters peculiar to Ti-
tle VII will vary among the jurisdictions.20 3
C. Did the Complainant Receive Minimum Due Process?
Notwithstanding the mandate of section 1738, federal courts are
not to give state court judgments preclusive effect if the state pro-
ceedings fail to comport with minimum due process standards.2°
As the Kremer Court stated, however, "no single model of proce-
dural fairness, let alone a particular form of procedure, is dictated
by the Due Process Clause. °205
Practically speaking, the minimum due process standard is a low
threshold to meet.20 6 The state preclusion requirement that liti-
gants have the incentive and fair opportunity to litigate the issues
fully in the first proceeding will generally guarantee complainants a
meaningful opportunity to litigate at least to the same degree as the
due process requirement would. Thus, where state procedures are
so deficient as to raise due process concerns, the state itself will
probably not give the judgment preclusive effect.207
203. In those states where the state's highest court and the federal district court hold
that state courts have concurrent jurisdiction over Title VII, a state judgment would
preclude all those matters that could have been raised under Title VII and which arose
out of the same transaction from which the state law claim arose. It would be irrelevant
for preclusion purposes that the federal rights under Title VII may be broader than those
under state law. Yet, in jurisdictions where the federal courts have not recognized that
state courts have concurrent jurisdiction over Title VII matters, the state judgment would
not have preclusive effect with respect to those matters unique to Title VII and which
were not litigated in state court. Thus, the preclusive effect of a state judgment with
respect to Title VII depends not only on the state's law of preclusion but also on the
nature of the federal court's jurisdiction over the Title VII claim.
This is not to say that a state judgment will have no preclusive effect if it is determined
that federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction. To the extent that rights under state law
are identical to or as broad as those under Title VII, the failure to raise those rights in
state court may preclude the complainant from doing so in a subsequent action.
204. Kremer, 456 U.S. at 481. ("state proceedings need do no more than satisfy the
minimum procedural requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause
in order to qualify for the full faith and credit guaranteed by federal law").
205. Id.
206. Only when the state procedures are "fundamentally flawed" can a state judg-
ment be denied recognition under § 1738. Id.
207. For example, under the procedures of some local FEP agencies in Nebraska,
discrimination charges can be resolved even though the employee is not a party to the
adjudicatory hearing. It is questionable whether such procedures satisfy minimum due
process. However, since the state itself does not accord preclusive effect to state court
affirmances of such decisions, the issue of minimum due process need not be addressed.
See Willborn, supra note 125, at 723 n.128.
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Nevertheless, the federal court should determine independently
whether minimum due process was afforded complainant on the
state level. It is doubtful that state court proceedings will be con-
stitutionally deficient in this regard. As for FEP agencies, most
permit complainant the opportunity to appear before the agency,
be represented by counsel, present evidence and cross-examine wit-
nesses.2"' Most, then, will satisfy minimum due process.
Furthermore, it is not essential that the complainant actually
avail himself of the procedural safeguards afforded by the state;
they need only have been available to him.2 "9 Thus, an administra-
tive finding of no probable cause based only on an informal hearing
is sufficient under the Kremer decision. 2 0  Even where the agency
determination results from an informal hearing based on unsworn
testimony, without benefit of cross-examination, or subpoenaed
production of relevant documents, an affirmance by the court has
been treated as the equivalent of a summary judgment and, as
such, on the merits for preclusion purposes. 21 1 Thus, it will be the
208. Most states provide for investigation of the charge similar to that conducted by
the EEOC and full scale evidentiary hearings before the state FEP agency. E.g., CAL.
GOV'T CODE §§ 12963, 12967-69 (West Supp. 1984); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 23,166 (West
1981); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 68, 7-102(c), 8-106 (1983); N.Y. EXEC. LAWS §§ 294, 297
(McKinney & Supp. 1983). Some FEP agencies have discovery comparable to that per-
mitted in a civil action, e.g., CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 12930, 12963 (West Supp. 1984).
Others are more limited, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 3.548 (602) (1982) (interroga-
tories, right to request documents); Rules Fla. Comm'n on Human Relations, § 22T-8.19,
3 EMPL. PRAC. GUIDE (CCH) § 21,829.19 (1981) (discovery availability may be limited
by hearing officer); Ill. Human Rts. Comm'n Rules & Practice & Procedure § 7, 3 EMPL.
PRAC. GUIDE (CCH) § 22,475.07 (1981) (interrogatories and document requests permit-
ted, but limitation on access to depositions).
Although most FEP agencies have provisions for discovery, non-FEP agencies may
not. In this regard, it is significant that the Court in Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co.,
415 U.S. 36, 57-58 (1974), stated that absence of discovery was one factor in not giving
preclusive effect to arbitration proceedings in a subsequent Title VII action. See also
McDonald v. City of West Branch, 104 S. Ct. 1779 (1984).
209. Kremer, 456 U.S. at 485 (a party's "fail[ure] to avail himself of the full proce-
dures provided by state law does not constitute a sign of their inadequacy").
210. Kremer himself had only informal hearings before the NYHRD. For a pre-
Kremer view that giving state determinations based on informal hearings preclusive effect
in Title VII actions is contrary to congressional intent, see Jackson, Matheson & Piskor-
ski, The Proper Role of Res Judicata and Collateral Estoppel in Title VII Suits, 79 MICH.
L. REV. 1485 (1981) (preclusive effect should be given to both state administrative and
state judicial determinations as long as they were based on a full adjudication of the
merits). Of course, the Kremer Court declined to make a distinction between informal
and full adjudicatory hearings. The distinction the Court drew for preclusion purposes
was between unreviewed and reviewed administrative determinations.
211. Mitchell v. National Broadcasting Co., 553 F.2d 265 (2d Cir. 1977). It has been
suggested that because of limited resources and a pressing case load, some state and local
agencies may make no probable cause determinations for institutional reasons unrelated
to the merits of the case. See generally Jackson, Matheson & Piskorski, supra note 207, at
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rare case where the minimum due process standard will be invoked
successfully to bar application of state preclusion principles.
Nevertheless, if due regard is paid to the proper application of
state preclusion principles, the Kremer decision can be applied
without infringing upon the substantive and procedural rights af-
forded under Title VII. The complainant is free to exhaust state
administrative remedies, and, in the event he loses, still resort to
the full panoply of Title VII's procedural and substantive rights.
Of course, if he unsuccessfully appeals an adverse administrative
determination, a final state court judgment on the merits will have
preclusive effect with respect to legal or factual issues that were
necessarily decided or which could have been raised before the
state proceedings. Yet, to the extent that Title VII substantive
rights were not and could not have been resolved in state court
proceedings, those rights may still be adjudicated in the manner set
forth in Title VII. The only serious infringement to Title VII's
scheme would occur if the complainant were forced to have a state
reviewing court hear his discrimination claim, and if he thereby
lost his right to a de novo judicial adjudication of his Title VII
rights. It is that situation this article addresses next.
D. Did the Employee Seek State Judicial Review of the Agency
Determination?
Kremer appealed the state FEP agency's determination of no
probable cause to the state judiciary. Having invoked state court
review and lost, he was deprived of a trial de novo on his Title VII
claim. The clear message of Kremer, then, is that a litigant who
wishes to preserve his right to a trial de novo on his federal claim
should not appeal an adverse state administrative determination.21 2
Suppose, however, that the plaintiff in our Title VII action had
prevailed on the state administrative level but, upon the employer's
appeal, the agency's determination was reversed by the state court.
Should the complainant who did not seek state judicial redress be
bound by the prior state judgment? Or should preclusion apply
only if he freely submitted his claim to state court?21 3 Once again,
1519 n. 198; Willborn, supra note 125, at 258-59 n.222; McCormack, Federalism and Sec-
tion 1983: Limitations on Judicial Enforcement of Constitutional Claims, 60 VA. L. REV.
250, 300 (1974).
212. Kremer, 456 U.S. at 470 n.8 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
213. The Second Circuit, which had given preclusive effect to state court judgments
on review prior to the Kremer decision, had suggested that only charging parties who
voluntarily sought review would be bound. Sinicropi v. Nassau County, 601 F.2d 60 (2d
Cir. 1979) ("The crucial factor is that appellant chose to submit her [employment dis-
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the preclusive effect to be given the state determination depends, at
the outset, on state law. If the state would make such a distinction,
the federal court's inquiry ends; it should likewise deny the state
judgment preclusive effect. If the state would not make the distinc-
tion, the federal court must then decide whether Congress intended
to modify what would otherwise be the mandate of section 1738.214
While the circuits addressing the issue have applied the Kremer
rationale regardless of which party sought judicial review,21 5 such
an application is inconsistent with Title VII's procedural scheme
and is not warranted by the Kremer decision. It is one thing to
deprive complainant of his statutory right of trial de novo when he
affirmatively seeks limited court review, as was the case in Kremer,
but it is quite another thing to so deprive him of his option to re-
sort to Title VII's enforcement scheme when he is involuntarily
brought before the state court. Simply stated, application of
Kremer to a non-appealling employee would dilute the procedural
rights Congress specifically provided for in Title VII.
In this regard, one cannot over-emphasize the fact that Congress
accorded complainants a statutory right to a trial de novo of their
Title VII claims.21 6 Indeed, in 1972, it had been proposed that the
EEOC act as the primary factfinder in the adjudication of discrimi-
nation charges, subject only to appellate review by the federal
courts. This view was rejected in favor of giving the federal courts
the plenary power to enforce Title VII's substantive rights.21 7
Thus, where conciliation attempts of the agency fail, the courts
were deemed to be the more impartial and expeditious forum to
crimination] case to the state courts for review and she cannot now relitigate the same
issues in federal court."). Id. at 62; see also Gunther v. Iowa State Men's Reformatory,
612 F.2d 1079 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 966 (1980).
214. Justice Blackmun in his Kremer dissent suggested that where the agency deci-
sion is favorable to the employee and reversed on appeal, it would be inimical to Title VII
to give the judgment preclusive effect. 456 U.S. at 475 n. 17. The majority expressed no
view on the question.
215. Hickman v. Electronic Keyboarding, Inc., 35 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA)
1281 (8th Cir. 1984); Gonsalves v. Alpine Country Club, 727 F.2d 27 (1st Cir. 1984);
Unger v. Consolidated Foods Corp., 693 F.2d 703, 710 n. 11 (7th Cir. 1982), cert. denied,
460 U.S. 1102 (1983) (dictum); Davis v. United States Steel Supply, 688 F.2d 166, 176
n.12 (3d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1014 (1983) (in § 1981 actions, mandate of
§ 1738 applies against party who did not seek court review; court specifically did not
address question in context of Title VII); Capers v. Long Island RR, 31 Fair Empl. Prac.
Cas. (BNA) 668 (S.D.N.Y. 1983).
216. Chandler v. Roudebush, 425 U.S. 840, 844-45 (1976); Alexander v. Gardner-
Denver, 415 U.S. 36, 38 (1974).
217. Chandler, 425 U.S. at 853-54; Alexander, 415 U.S. at 45.
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resolve the discrimination charge.21 8
Prior to Kremer, the Court consistently gave effect to Congress's
preference for a full judicial determination. Given Title VII's pro-
cedural scheme, the Supreme Court held that a complainant could
press his discrimination charge in other forums without limiting
his right to a de novo trial under Title VII. Thus, an adverse deter-
mination by other forums would not preclude complainant from
seeking redress in federal court.
The guaranteed right of a de novo judicial determination under
Title VII was forcefully expressed in Alexander v. Denver-Gardner
Co. 219 There, an arbitral finding of no discrimination was held not
to bar a de novo determination of one's Title VII right. In the
Court's view,
the resolution of statutory or constitutional issues is a primary
responsibility of courts, and judicial construction has proved es-
pecially necessary with respect to Title VII, whose broad lan-
guage frequently can be given meaning only by reference to
public law concepts.22 °
Also, in terms of the adjudicatory process itself, the Court recog-
nized that the procedural incidents of a civil action, such as formal
evidentiary rules, had advantages over more informal
procedures.22'
Similarly, in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green,222 the Court
made it clear that a finding of no reasonable cause by the EEOC
did not bar resort to one's judicial remedies. Even though the
EEOC might have particular expertise in the area, the complain-
ant's right to a trial de novo was preserved.223 In Chandler v.
Roudebush,224 the Court held that public employees had a right to
a trial de novo notwithstanding an adverse determination by the
218. See Chandler, 425 U.S. at 851. As Senator Dominick, the chief proponent of
giving final resolution of disputes to the federal courts, stated:
Determination of employment civil rights deserves and requires non-partisan
judgment. This judgment is best afforded by Federal court judges who, shielded
from political influence by life tenure, are more likely to withstand political
pressures and render their decisions in a climate tempered by judicial reflection
and supported by historical judicial independence.
1972 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 19, at 493; see also remarks of Senator Domi-
nick, id. at 495, 1442-53 (federal courts can adjudicate civil rights claims more expedi-
tiously than the EEOC).
219. 415 U.S. 36 (1974).
220. Id. at 57.
221. Id. at 57-58.
222. 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
223. Id. at 807.
224. 425 U.S. 840 (1970).
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United States Civil Service Commission. Thus, neither an adverse
arbitral decision nor an adverse administrative determination by a
federal agency affected the procedural scheme Congress devised.
Included in this list by Kremer, as well as by earlier Court deci-
sions, were adverse state administrative determinations. Of course,
Kremer did hold that state judicial affirmance of an adverse admin-
istrative determination bars a trial de novo under Title VII. Thus,
by appealing an adverse administrative decision, the employee, in
effect, loses his statutory right to a trial de novo. The question
after Kremer, though, is whether any state judgment, regardless of
which party sought review, strips the complainant of this statutory
right. Disregarding the line of cases before Kremer, lower federal
courts view the decision as rejecting the position that complainants
have the right to opt for a trial de novo.225 Accordingly, they have
applied the Kremer rationale even when the employee did not seek
state court review.226
To apply preclusion against the non-appealing employee may be
consistent with the view that preclusion applies to plaintiffs and
defendants equally.227 In addition, a state court that reverses an
agency determination probably scrutinizes more closely the merits
of the case than an affirmance of a finding of no discrimination.
For when the court reverses the agency determination, it is saying
that on review of the entire record there is no substantial evidence
to support a finding of discrimination. Thus, the court in effect is
rendering an independent judgment that the claim is meritless
rather than deferring to the agency's judgment. 22s Notwithstand-
225. See cases cited supra note 215.
226. Id.
227. See generally Currie, Res Judicata: The Neglected Defense, 45 U. CHI. L. REV.
317, 333 (1978); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 22 comment a (1982); C.
WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 9, at § 4447.
To apply Kremer to a non-appealing complainant also appears to be consistent with the
current Court's view that parties do not have an unencumbered right to a federal forum
for the vindication of their federal rights. As stated in Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90,
104 (1980): "There is, in short, no reason to believe that Congress intended to provide a
person claiming a federal right an unrestricted opportunity to relitigate an issue already
decided in state court simply because the issue arose in a state proceeding in which he
would rather not have been engaged at all." Yet, although the party precluded in Allen
was a defendant on the state level, he raised the fourth amendment issue in state court.
More importantly, he had a full judicial adjudication of the issue.
228. In addition, one can only speculate as to whether application of Kremer to a
non-appealing employee will reduce exhaustion of state administrative remedies, and
thereby undermine Congress's intent to give states the opportunity to resolve discrimina-
tion claims. Where the state agency has a reputation of being sympathetic to such claims,
a potential Title VII complainant might not avoid state administrative remedies for fear
that if it prevails on the administrative level, the defendant may force him into state court
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ing these arguments, however, Kremer should be limited to cases
where the employee voluntarily entered the state court system.
This position derives from several factors.
First, Title VII, even as interpreted by Kremer, recognizes com-
plainant's right to exhaust state administrative remedies without
sacrificing his right to a federal trial de novo. Even if the state
gives preclusive effect to administrative determinations, the scheme
of Title VII indicates that Congress did not intend section 1738 to
be applicable. Lower federal courts, in the wake of Kremer, have
permitted a trial de novo on one's Title VII claim where the com-
plainant lost at the administrative level, but failed to appeal.22 9
One might question why the complainant should be in a worse po-
sition if he has prevailed at the state administrative level. If he has
the option of a judicial adjudication, should he not be able to exer-
cise that option regardless of the posture he finds himself in at the
conclusion of administrative hearings?
If Title VII guarantees one bite of the judicial apple, be it state
or federal, it would be violative of Title VII's scheme to apply pre-
clusion when the complainant did not affirmatively seek judicial
review, but was forced into state court. Indeed, such a policy
would encourage an employer who lost on his state claim to appeal
to state court with the hope of foreclosing a Title VII action. Sim-
ply stated, to apply preclusion principles against a complainant
who did not seek review would vitiate congressional intent to per-
mit exhaustion of state administrative remedies without jeopardiz-
ing one's right to a federal fact-finding forum.
In addition, the more recent decision of Migra v. Warren City
School District,23 ° suggests that only the party seeking court review
should be bound by the state judgment. Specifically, in Migra, Jus-
tice Blackmun drew a distinction between applying preclusion
against a party who had been in an offensive position in state court
and applying it against a party who had been in a defensive
on review. Justice Blackmun was concerned that fear of state court reversal might have
just this effect. Kremer, 456 U.S. at 504 n. 18. Even if the employee is not deterred from
exhausting his administrative remedies, the argument itself misses the point for Kremer
recognizes that all complainants can freely exhaust their state administrative remedies
and still resort to any of the rights accorded them in Title VII.
229. Jones v. Progress Lighting Corp., 36 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 25 (E.D. Pa.
1984); Snow v. Dep't of Prisons, 543 F. Supp. 752 (D. Nev. 1982); Weise v. Syracuse, 553
F. Supp. 675 (N.D.N.Y. 1982). Contra O'Hara v. Board of Educ., 36 Empl. Prac. Dec.
(CCH) 34,942 (D.N.J. June 27, 1984); Buckhalter v. Pepsi-Cola Gen. Bottlers, 35 Fair
Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 881 (N.D. Ill. 1984).
230. 104 S. Ct. 892 (1984).
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When her contract for employment was not renewed, the plain-
tiff in Migra commenced a state civil action for breach of contract
and wrongful interference with her contract rights. She prevailed
on the state court level and was awarded reinstatement and com-
pensatory damages. Thereafter, she commenced a federal action
alleging, in part, claims under sections 1983 and 1985. The thrust
of her federal action was that her contract had not been renewed to
punish her for the exercise of her first amendment rights. Since the
plaintiff could have raised the federal claims in state court, the
mandate of section 1738 precluded her from doing so in federal
court. As Justice Blackmun observed, plaintiff could have brought
a federal action initially, rather than going to state court as she
chose to do.2 32 She did not have the right to proceed in state court,
and then turn to federal court for the adjudication of her federal
claims.
Yet, Title VII, in contrast to many other legislative schemes, re-
quires deferral to state FEP agencies as a condition to pursuing
one's right in the federal system. Accordingly, the complainant
cannot be said to submit his claim freely to state administrative
proceedings. Of course, the complainant is not required to exhaust
his state administrative remedies. The critical question, though,
should be whether the employee freely submitted his claim to state
court, not whether he voluntarily submitted it to the administrative
agency.233
231. Id. at 898 n.7.
232. Id.
233. See Montana v. United States, 440 U.S. 147, 165 (1979) (preclusion may be
inappropriate when the claimant did not freely and without reservation submit his federal
claims for decision by the state courts. . . and have them decided there") (quoting Eng-
land v. Medical Examiners, 375 U.S. 411, 419 (1964)). Although it has been suggested
that Kremer impliedly rejected any distinction between those claimants who voluntarily
sought state court consideration and those who did not, see Hickman v. Electronic
Keyboarding, Inc., 35 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1281 (8th Cir. 1984), the Court has
more recently cited the Montana language with approval in Haring, 103 S. Ct. at 2373 n.7
(1983). But see Gonsalves v. Alpine Country Club, 727 F.2d 27, 29 (1st Cir. 1984)
("When [complainants) elected to proceed with their complaint filed with the [Rhode
Island Commission on Human Rights] they set into motion a chain of events which they
knew or should have known would in all probability lead to a subsequent state court
appeal by the unsuccessful party. What is more, they were under no legal compulsion to
press their RICHR complaint to a conclusion. . . .To that extent, they were in a very
real sense the master of their own destiny at the state level. But once they made their
election to proceed apace at that level, they are barred from thereafter proceeding in
federal court on the same claim."). The irony in the position expressed by the Gonsalves
court is that it views the administrative and judicial proceedings as one unit; that is, if
complainant invokes his administrative remedies he is deemed to invoke his state judicial
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Finally, Kremer itself is consistent with this approach. Kremer
filed his charge with the EEOC which deferred it to the New York
Division of Human Rights pursuant to Title VII's deferral scheme.
It was no defense to preclusion that he was compelled to go to the
state agency. Title VII, though, does not require exhaustion of
state administrative remedies, only initial resort to such remedies.
By choosing to exhaust his state administrative remedies, Kremer
freely chose to submit his state discrimination claim to state ad-
ministrative proceedings.234 Under the state's statutory election of
remedy provision, Kremer was thus precluded from a de novo judi-
cial adjudication of his state discrimination claim.235 Yet, up to the
point of exhausting his state administrative remedies, he had not
sacrificed a de novo adjudication of his Title VII claim.2 36 It was
only the appeal to state court that triggered preclusion with respect
to Kremer's Title VII rights.
As the Kremer court stated, no provision of Title VII requires
claimants to pursue in state court an unfavorable administrative
decision.237 Having done so, however, Kremer could not complain
of the preclusive effect the state judgment might have. Accord-
ingly, if complainant does not affirmatively seek review, the
Kremer holding is not applicable. Otherwise, the right to bypass
state judicial review would be meaningless. Congress did not in-
tend deferral to state agencies to foreclose directly or indirectly an
individual claimant's right to a de novo adjudication of one's Title
VII claim. 238 Accordingly, the federal court should reject the em-
ployer's preclusion defense when the employee did not affirma-
tively seek state judicial review, even though the state of rendition
would give the judgment preclusive effect.
remedies as well. Yet, the rationale of the Kremer majority viewed the two proceedings
as distinct units.
234. There might be some question whether Kremer actually had a real choice since,
under New York law, once one opts for administrative redress, one is foreclosed from
seeking direct judicial redress. Thus, failure to exhaust his administrative remedies
would have amounted to abandonment of this state claim. In view of Congress's intent to
encourage states to combat employment discrimination, it is doubtful that it intended to
force complainants to abandon state administrative proceedings in order to protect their
rights under Title VII.
235. Under New York's fair employment practices statute, a person has the right to
seek direct judicial redress. Resorting to administrative remedies, however, constitutes
an election of remedies precluding de novo adjudication. N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 297(9)
(McKinney 1982).
236. Kremer, 456 U.S. at 470 n.7.
237. Id. at 469.
238. See Davis v. United States Steel Supply, 688 F.2d 166, 188-89 (1982), cert. de-
nied, 460 U.S. 1014 (1983) (Gibbons, J., dissenting).
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V. RECONCILIATION OF TITLE VII AND KREMER
Using the framework discussed above, the potential Title VII
litigant is guaranteed a right to a trial de novo of his Title VII
rights if the federal courts in a Title VII action (1) carefully limit
the preclusive effect of a prior judicial determination only to those
Title VII matters that actually were or could have been litigated in
the prior state court proceeding, and (2) limit the Kremer rationale
to employees who seek state judicial review of unfavorable admin-
istrative determinations. In effect, this approach guarantees com-
plainants the opportunity to opt for a judicial determination of
their substantive rights under Title VII as Congress provided in the
statute.
In those states where the administrative agency is the primary
adjudicatory authority for state discrimination claims, 239 the com-
plainant must make certain sacrifices to exercise this option. The
complainant who loses at the conclusion of state administrative
proceedings has to choose between (1) appealing within the state
system and thereby triggering application of Kremer, or (2) aban-
doning his state statutory claim and proceeding with his Title VII
remedies. Abandonment of one's state FEP claim may mean sacri-
ficing a potential recovery greater than that afforded under Title
VII. Yet, in states that have a deferential standard of review, the
possibility of a reversal on one's state claim is not great. Thus, the
complainant would not be sacrificing that much in exchange for a
guaranteed de novo judicial determination of his Title VII claim.
In addition, to hold him to such a choice would be consistent with
the Kremer rationale that a complainant is entitled to only one ju-
dicial determination of his discrimination claim.24°
In those few states that review agency determinations de novo, 24 1
the complainant's right to a full judicial adjudication of his dis-
crimination claim is not so encumbered. He can proceed to state
court after an unfavorable agency determination and, taking ad-
vantage of state judicial procedures, obtain a de novo determina-
tion of his rights under state law. On the other hand, if he prefers
239. E.g., GA. CODE §§ 45-19-36 to -39; (Michie Supp. 1984); Ill. Human Rts. Act,
ch. 68 § 8-111(D); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 68, 1-101, 7-102, 8-103, 107, 111 (Smith-Hurd
Supp. 1984); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 4112.03-.06 (Page 1973).
240. Moreover, although the complainant may have to abandon his state FEP claims
he may still assert state common law claims. Since those claims probably could not have
been raised before the FEP agency, they would not be precluded under state preclusion
principles.
241. E.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 37.2606 (West Supp. 1984); MICH. STAT.
ANN. § 3.548(606)(1) (Callaghan 1984).
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the procedural incidents of the federal system, he can resort to Ti-
tle VII's procedural scheme and substantive protection. Moreover,
he may be able to join his state claims in federal court under the
doctrine of pendent jurisdiction.242 If he remains in the state sys-
tem, however, the state court judgment will have preclusive effect
as discussed in this article.
Where complainant is entitled to direct judicial redress on his
state discrimination claim, 243 Kremer has limited effect on his right
to a full judicial determination of his discrimination claim. As-
suming that state courts have concurrent jurisdiction over Title
VII, all federal and state theories of relief can be joined in state
court. Even if federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction, complain-
ant may be able to join all his related state claims in federal court.
In this way, both the goals of conservation of resources and full
judicial adjudication of discrimination claims are served. At worst,
the complainant may have to commence separate state and federal
actions; and unless the parties otherwise agree,2 " whichever action
results in a judgment first will have preclusive effect.2 45 The com-
plainant still will have been guaranteed one full judicial adjudica-
tion of his claim. He should not be heard to complain that he did
not have successive state and federal de novo judicial proceedings.
Implemented this way, Kremer does not undermine Title VII.
After exhaustion of state administrative remedies, a complainant
can still avail himself of Title VII's procedural scheme wherein the
federal courts can ensure the level of substantive protection Con-
gress intended. At the same time, defendant is not subjected to
more than one judicial proceeding on the same claims.
Thus, even where state administrative proceedings are not as
meaningful as those afforded in federal court, as long as the em-
ployee does not seek state review, these limitations will not ad-
versely affect his substantive rights under Title VII nor the
interplay of federal administrative and judicial forums. He still has
his right to a de novo federal trial on his Title VII claim. Any state
administrative inadequacies will only lessen enforcement of state
242. See supra notes 200-02 and accompanying text; Catania, supra note 200, at 831-
32.
243. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-13 (West Supp. 1984); N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 297 (McKin-
ney 1982); 43 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 962(c) (Purdon Supp. 1984).
244. Parties may agree that a state judgment will not have preclusive effect in a subse-
quent proceeding. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 26(1)(a) comment a
(1982). Presumably under the mandate of § 1738, if the state recognizes the validity of
such stipulations, the federal court should as well. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDG-
MENTS § 86 comment f, illustration 7 (1982).
245. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 14 (1982).
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fair employment laws. Such an impact may be less than desirable
and at odds with Congress's general commitment to encourage the
states to eradicate discrimination in the workplace. In substantive
terms, however, Congress sets its threshold of protection in Title
VII, and as long as the enforcement of those rights are not diluted
the basic remedial purpose of Title VII is served.
VI. CONCLUSION
Prior to Kremer, it was clear that an employee had a right to a
de novo judicial determination of his Title VII rights. After
Kremer, the employee still has the right to exercise that option as
long as he does not appeal an adverse state administrative determi-
nation of his discrimination claim. Thus limited to state court af-
firmances of adverse agency determinations, Kremer strikes a
proper balance between the employee's right to a full adjudication
of his Title VII claim, and the employer's right to be protected
from successive civil actions. Only if Kremer is extended to an
employee whose favorable administrative finding is reversed on
employer's appeal will the employee lose this important option.
Given Congress's intent as expressed in Title VII's procedural
scheme, such an extension, however, is unwarranted.
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